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Nudges comprise a key component of the regulatory toolbox. Both the 
public and private sectors use nudges extensively in various domains, 
ranging from environmental regulation to health, food and financial 
regulation. This article focuses on a particular type of nudge: social 
norm nudges. It discusses, for the first time, the privacy risks of such 
nudges. Social norm nudges induce behavioral change by capitalizing 
on people’s desire to fit in with others, on their predisposition to social 
conformity, and on their susceptibility to the way information is 
framed. In order to design effective social norm nudges, personal 
information about individuals and their behavior must be collected, 
processed, and later disseminated (usually in some aggregated form). 
Thus, the use of social norm nudges opens up the possibility for 
privacy threats. Despite the significant privacy concerns raised by 
social norm nudges, research on the topic has been scarce. This article 
makes two contributions to the understanding of the privacy risks 
underlying the use of social norm nudges. The first contribution is 
analytic: it demonstrates that using social norm nudges can pose a 
threat to individuals’ privacy through re-identification of anonymized 
data. This risk was demonstrated in other contexts (e.g. Netflix 
recommendation contest). The second contribution is policy oriented: 
it argues that the strategy of differential privacy can be used to 
mitigate these privacy risks and offer a way to employ social norms 
nudges while protecting individuals’ privacy.
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I. Introduction 
One of the most important trends in contemporary regulatory practice 
has been the attempt to incorporate insights from behavioral economics,1
especially nudges and de-biasing mechanisms, into the regulatory toolbox.2
For instance, in July 2010, the United Kingdom established the Behavioral 
Insights Team (“BIT”) – otherwise known as the “Nudge Unit” – which is 
dedicated to developing public policy solutions based on insights from psy-
 1. PETE LUNN, REGULATORY, POLICY AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 25–55 (2014). 
 2. Oren Perez, Can Experts Be Trusted and What Can Be Done About It? Insights 
from the Biases and Heuristics Literature, in NUDGING AND THE LAW: A EUROPEAN 
PERSPECTIVE 115 (Alberto Alemanno & Anne-Lise Sibony, eds., 2015); David Tannenbaum, 
Craig R. Fox & Todd Rogers, On the Misplaced Politics of Behavioural Policy Interventions,
1 NATURE HUM. BEHAV. 1, 1 (2017); see also RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 6–9, 17–39 
(2008) [hereinafter THALER & SUNSTEIN, NUDGE].
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chology and behavioral economics.3 Three years later, then-U.S. President 
Barack Obama signed an executive order establishing the White House So-
cial and Behavioral Sciences Team, based on the understanding that 
“[a]dopting the insights of behavioral science will help bring our govern-
ment into the 21st century in a wide range of ways.”4 These examples, 
among others, demonstrate how policy makers incorporate social norm 
nudges into the regulatory toolbox and how they use them in diverse do-
mains, from environmental regulation and health to food and financial regu-
lation.5
A nudge can be defined as any aspect of choice architecture that alters 
an individual’s behavior in a predictable way, without limiting his choices 
or significantly changing incentives.6 Using this broad definition, Thaler and 
 3. It is important to note that in 2014, the BIT became a social purpose company, par-
tially owned by the Cabinet Office. The aims of the BIT, however, remain the same, namely: 
(1) making public services more cost-effective and easier for citizens to use; (2) improving 
outcomes by introducing a more realistic model of human behaviour to policy; and (3) ena-
bling people to make better choices for themselves. See generally About Us, BEHAVIOURAL 
INSIGHTS TEAM, https://www.behaviouralinsights.co.uk/about-us/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2019). 
 4. USING BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE INSIGHTS TO BETTER SERVE THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE, EXEC. ORDER NO. 13707, 80 FED. REG. 181, 1 (Sept. 15, 2015); Press Release, The 
White House, Office of the Press Secretary, FACT SHEET: New Progress on Using Behav-
ioral Science Insights to Better Serve the American People (Sept. 15, 2016), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/09/15/fact-sheet-new-progress-
using-behavioral-science-insights-better-serve. 
 5. For an extensive, although partial, summary of empirical “nudges” and interesting 
behavioral change interventions that have been deployed around the world in the last decade, 
see Mark Egan, Nudge Database v1.2, https://www.stir.ac.uk/media/stirling/services/faculties/
social-sciences/research/documents/Nudge-Database-1.2.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2019). 
 6. THALER & SUNSTEIN, NUDGE, supra note 2 at 6, 105-10. Changing the default rule 
in a pension plan is an example of a nudge. Redesigning the 401(k)-retirement saving plan 
enrollment default rule from opt-in to opt-out dramatically increased employees’ participation 
in retirement saving plans. Under an automatic enrollment default rule, employees are auto-
matically enrolled in their company’s 401(k) plan unless they elect to opt out of it. See James 
J. Choi, David Laibson et al., For Better or For Worse: Default Effects and 401(k) Savings 
Behavior, in PERSPECTIVES IN THE ECONOMICS OF AGING 81-121 (David A. Wise, ed., 2004); 
Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participa-
tion and Savings Behavior, 116 Q.J. ECON. 1149, 1149–87 (2001). On the effect of opting-in 
or opting-out from default rules, see Alberto Abadie & Sebastien Gay, The Impact of Pre-
sumed Consent Legislation on Cadaveric Organ Donation: A Cross-Country Study, 25 J.
HEALTH ECON. 599, 610 (2006); Eric J. Johnson & Daniel Goldstein, Do Defaults Save 
Lives?, 302 SCIENCE 1338 (2003); Eric J. Johnson et al., Framing, Probability Distortions 
and Insurance Decisions, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 35, 46-48 (1993); Daniel Pichert & Kon-
stantinos V. Katsikopoulos, Green Defaults: Information Presentation and Pro-
Environmental Behaviour 28 J. ENVTL. PSYCHOL. 63, 67–69 (2008); William Samuelson & 
Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 35 
(1988). For additional examples, see Gerd Bohner & Lena E. Schlüter, A Room with a View-
point Revisited: Descriptive Norms and Hotel Guests’ Towel Reuse Behavior, PLOS ONE 1
(Aug. 2014); Noah J. Goldstein et al., A Room with a Viewpoint: Using Social Norms to Moti-
vate Environmental Conservation in Hotels, 35 J. CONSUMER RES. 472 (2008). 
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Sunstein have identified a broad range of nudges, including ones that take 
advantage of an individual’s sensitivity to social norms.7
“Social norm nudges” inform people about what others are doing and 
thereby induce them to alter their behavior.8 The success of a “social norm” 
nudge is attributed to people’s propensity to use others’ behavior as an ap-
propriate guide for their own, and it is most influential when it is as person-
ally relevant and as specific as possible.9 The advent of social nudges repre-
sents a new way for policymakers to promote a range of welfare-enhancing 
behaviors. The most sophisticated and effective nudges are those that are 
tailored to the unique characteristics of individual citizens. However, as in-
dividual tailoring often depends on the collection and processing of personal 
information, privacy concerns become a fundamental problem for the use of 
social nudges. To date, the potential ramifications of those privacy threats 
have not received sufficient attention by scholars and policymakers.10
The most common approach for protecting individuals’ privacy con-
cerns when there is a need to use private information for public policy goals 
is de-identification. De-identification generally involves the removal of spe-
cific identifying marker, such as, but not limited to, names, e-mail address-
es, social security numbers, etcetera.11 De-identification techniques suffer, 
however, from significant limitations. These limitations were exposed by 
the famous incident in which Netflix released supposedly anonymized in-
formation regarding the viewing habits of their subscribers; the data was 
cross-referenced with the open dataset of IMDB reviews (an online database 
of media-related information), leading to the re-identification of some indi-
viduals.12 Over the past decade, the inherent limitations of common de-
identification techniques as a tool for protecting people’s privacy were high-
lighted by various writers.13 These limitations and the risks they pose for 
privacy are also relevant to social norm nudges which are based on the dis-
semination of private data (albeit in a processed form). 
This article does not claim that such privacy risks should completely 
prevent regulators from using social norm nudges. Rather, this article asserts 
that to allay these privacy concerns, policymakers should adopt a differen-
tial privacy framework, which offers better protection to privacy than exist-
 7. See generally THALER & SUNSTEIN, NUDGE, supra note 2. 
 8. Using nudges as a form of regulatory intervention is generally referred to as “liber-
tarian paternalism” or “soft paternalism.”
 9. THALER & SUNSTEIN, NUDGE, supra note 2 at 53–74. See also infra notes 31–41 
and accompanying text. 
 10. Andreas Kapsner and Barbara Sandfuchs’ article titled “Nudging as a Threat to Pri-
vacy” is a rare exception. See Andreas Kapsner & Barbara Sandfuchs, Nudging as a Threat to 
Privacy, 6 REV. PHIL. PSYCH. 455 (2015). 
 11. See infra notes 146–56. 
 12. See infra notes 172–74. 
 13. See infra Part IV. 
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ing ad-hoc de-identification techniques. This framework also offers a way 
to balance individuals’ privacy concerns with the policy advantages of so-
cial nudges. 
Differential privacy is a formal mathematical framework for guarantee-
ing privacy protection in data analysis.14 Differential privacy is not a single 
method, but rather a definition or a standard that states the requirements for 
any proposed privacy preserving solution.15 It is based on the idea of intro-
ducing “noise” into data,16 thus making it harder to de-identify any specific 
individual.17 Under the framework of differential privacy, privacy is not just 
a property of the output, but rather a property of the computation that gener-
ates the output.18 Thus, this technique is considered to be a relatively effec-
tive method to protect against privacy breaches and attacks.19
The idea that differential privacy methods can be used to mitigate pri-
vacy threats in the context of social norm nudges has not been discussed 
previously in the legal literature.20 This article seek to fill this void by 
demonstrating, both theoretically and empirically, how regulators can use 
the differential privacy technique in order to protect individuals’ privacy in 
the context of social norm nudges. 
 14. Cynthia Dwork, A Firm Foundation for Private Data Analysis, 54 COMM. OF THE 
ACM 86, 91 (2011); see also Alexandra Wood et al., Differential Privacy: A Primer for A 
Non-Technical Audience, 21 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 209, 219–20 (2018). Namely, a ran-
domized algorithm A : Xn • Y is (•, ) differentially private if for every two databases S, S’ • 
Xn that differ on one row, and every set T • Y , we have Pr[A(S) • T] • e• · Pr[A(S’) • T] + D. 
 15. Erica Klarreich, Privacy by the Numbers: A New Approach to Safeguarding Data,
QUANTA MAG. (Dec. 10, 2012), https://www.quantamagazine.org/a-mathematical-approach-
to-safeguarding-private-data-20121210/.
 16. See generally Cynthia Dwork, Differential Privacy: A Survey of Results, THEORY 
& APPLICATIONS OF MODELS OF COMPUTATION 1, 1, 3 (Apr. 2008). 
 17. See Wood et al., supra note 14 at 223; see also Yehuda Lindell & Eran Omri, A
Practical Application of Differential Privacy to Personalized Online Advertising 3 (Jan. 2011) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Cryptology ePrint Archive) (“differential privacy 
guarantees that hardly any information is gained on individual records upon seeing the output 
of a computation”). 
 18. Wood et al., supra note 14 at 221. 
 19. Id. at 235. Although, as will be further discussed below, the level of protection may 
vary. See infra Part IV. 
 20. The references we were able to find only discuss the use of differential privacy in 
general. See, e.g., Andrew Chin & Anne Klinefelter, Differential Privacy As A Response to the 
Reidentification Threat: The Facebook Advertiser Case Study, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1417, 1427 
(2012); Anna Myers & Grant Nelson, Differential Privacy: Raising the Bar, 1 GEO. L. TECH.
REV. 135, 139 (2016); Kobbi Nissim et al., Bridging the Gap Between Computer Science and 
Legal Approaches to Privacy, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 687, 690 (2018); Andrea Scripa Els, 
Artificial Intelligence as a Digital Privacy Protector, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 217, 218 (2017); 
Felix T. Wu, Defining Privacy and Utility in Data Sets, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 1117, 1137–40 
(2013).
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Using differential privacy algorithm involves, however, some tradeoffs 
between accuracy and privacy.21 More “noise” yields better privacy but also 
less accurate computation (and, hence, poorer social norm nudges). Thus, 
policymakers should keep in mind that privacy comes at a cost, and that 
achieving “perfect” privacy is not always an option. Notwithstanding the 
above, this framework should enable regulators to maintain the advantages 
of social norm nudges while simultaneously protecting the privacy of the 
individuals who make up the sample. 
The article is organized as follows. Part II begins with a brief introduc-
tion to the theory of nudges, focusing especially on social norm nudges. Part 
III develops a framework for evaluating privacy harms that could ensue 
when implementing social norm nudges and explores the privacy risks that 
may result from the use of social nudges at each and every step of the nudg-
ing process. Moreover, it focuses on privacy threats raised during, and as a 
result of, the communication of information, and demonstrate that these 
risks are likely to evolve in unforeseen ways over the course of the next few 
years. Part IV first examines the use of de-identification techniques in the 
legislative efforts to balance the utility of data with individual privacy inter-
ests. It then demonstrates that regulation that is more efficient is necessary 
and recommends the adoption of solutions based on differential privacy 
models. Finally, it discusses possible tradeoffs between privacy and the effi-
cacy of nudges. To illustrate the threats to privacy, as well as the advantages 
of the differential privacy framework, this article uses both a hypothetical 
scenario and real data relating to water consumption. Lastly, Part V summa-
rizes important points and concludes the article. 
II. Nudges: Setting the Scene 
The term “nudge” was coined by Richard Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein 
in their book, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth and Hap-
piness.22 Thaler and Sunstein define a nudge as “any aspect of the choice ar-
chitecture that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbid-
ding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives.”23 In 
 21. It is important to emphasize that using differential privacy has its costs on the accu-
racy of the information that is disseminated. See infra Part IV.
 22. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, NUDGE, supra note 2, at 6. Thaler and Sunstein are 
among the leading researchers in the field. Noteworthy, however, are other concepts such as 
asymmetry paternalism and liberal paternalism which suggest using similar instruments to 
“push” people towards the required direction. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, 
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 185 SCI. 1124, 1124 (1974); Daniel 
Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics, 93 AM.
ECON. REV. 1449, 1450 (2003). 
 23. THALER & SUNSTEIN, NUDGE, supra note 2, at 6. 
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other words, nudge theory is concerned with how to achieve predictable 
changes in people’s behaviors, taking into account known heuristics and bi-
ases.24 To illustrate the steering potential of nudges, Thaler and Sunstein use 
the example of a cafeteria.25 They argue that people’s choices are as much a 
result of their preferences as they are a result of the cafeteria’s setup. In fact, 
they demonstrate that when the placement of products is altered, there is a 
change in the food products people will choose.26
The term “nudges” is sometimes used loosely. However, to be correctly 
characterized as a nudge, a policy tool cannot significantly change the mate-
rial incentives facing the individuals (e.g., using tax or sanction),27 nor force 
the individual to follow a particular path using regulatory instruments such 
as mandates or bans.28 In other words, although nudges aim to push people 
toward a particular direction, they do not limit the original set of choices 
available; therefore, they are choice-preserving. A public law constraint on 
the use of nudges is that their use should increase the welfare of the individ-
ual being nudged or that of society as a whole.29
 24. Pelle Gulddbotg Hansen, The Definition of Nudge and Libertarian Paternalism: 
Does the Hand Fit the Glove? 1 EUR. J. RISK REG. 1, 4 (2016) (“A nudge is a function of (I) 
any attempt at influencing people’s judgment, choice or behaviour in a predictable way (1) 
that is made possible because of cognitive boundaries, biases, routines and habits in individual 
and social decision-making posing barriers for people to perform rationally in their own de-
clared self-interests and which (2) works by making use of those boundaries, biases, routines, 
and habits as integral parts of such attempts.”) 
 25. THALER & SUNSTEIN, NUDGE, supra note 2, at 1–3. 
 26. Making certain foods easily accessible, aesthetically pleasing, or placing them right 
near the entrance all tend to significantly increase consumption rates of certain foods. Cafete-
ria owners can use this information to arrange foods to achieve various goals: to encourage 
healthy eating, to get kids to pick the same foods that they would on their own, to maximize 
sales of certain foods based on suppliers, or to maximize profit. Id.
 27. Therefore, taxes, subsidies or fines are not considered nudges. See Cass R. Sun-
stein, WHY NUDGE?: THE POLITICS OF LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISM 57-59 (Yale Univ. Press 
2014); Cass R. Sunstein, The Ethics of Nudging, 32 YALE J. ON REG. 413, 417 (2015) (“[i]f an 
intervention imposes significant material costs on choosers, it might of course be justified, but 
it is not a nudge.”) 
 28. Todd Haugh, Nudging Corporate Compliance, 54 AM. BUS. L.J. 683, 690 (2017); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Nudging: A Very Short Guide, 37 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 583, 583–584 
(2014); see also Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics 
and the Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism”, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1211–12 (2003). 
 29. This assertion is, of course, not free of criticism. Further, “this begs the question of 
who makes the determination of what is good and by what measure, but as a general matter, 
nudges are not to be ‘employed to sway people to make bad decisions that they will later re-
gret’.” See Haugh, supra note 28, at 690–91 (citing Richard H. Thaler, The Power of Nudges, 
for Good and Bad, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com.proxy4.
athensams.net/2015/11/01/upshot/the-power-of-nudges-for-good-and-bad.html). 
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Lehner, Mont, and Heiskanen claim that nudging techniques can be 
grouped into four different clusters:30 (1) simplification and framing of in-
formation,31 (2) physical choice architecture (changing the physical envi-
ronment),32 (3) default policy,33 and (4) social norm nudges. Though nudges 
can be used in a plethora of ways, this article focuses on the privacy con-
cerns implicated in the last group of social norm nudges. However, before 
examining these concerns in depth, it is worth providing an overview of so-
cial norm nudges. 
Social norms nudges hinge on the human tendency to follow the herd.34
In other words, individuals’ choices and preferences can be influenced by 
the perceived behavior of others.35 This influence is either due to peer pres-
sure or because the individual assumes that others have better information.36
For instance, if an individual observes a group engaged in a particular action 
or perceives them to be thinking in a particular way, the individual is likely 
to then use that information as a signal of what is the appropriate way to 
think or behave.37 Alternatively, when an individual perceives her own be-
havior or thoughts to be different from the one which is “socially accepta-
 30. Matthias Lehner et al., Nudging – A Promising Tool for Sustainable Consumption 
Behaviour?, 134 J. CLEANER PRODUCTION 166, 168–69 (2016). 
 31. This cluster consists of tools designed mainly to make information more readily 
available and comprehensive, therefore eliciting a change in the individual’s decision-making 
process. Warnings that are printed on packs of cigarettes are a good example of this type of 
nudging. It provides people with information regarding the dangers of smoking with the aim 
of nudging them to stop or at least reduce the consumption of cigarettes. See id. at 169. 
 32. The physical environment in which one makes a decision has an impact on the in-
dividual’s choice. Nudges that build on this insight utilize changes to the physical environ-
ment to steer individuals towards a certain choice. Id. The cafeteria example discussed above 
can serve as a good example of such nudges. See, e.g., Marvin E. Goldberg & Kunter Gunasti, 
Creating an Environment in Which Youths are Encouraged to Eat a Healthier Diet, 26 J. PUB.
POL’Y & MARKETING 162 (2007); John Pucher and Ralph Buehler, Making Cycling Irresisti-
ble: Lessons from The Netherlands, Denmark and Germany, 28 TRANSP. REV. 495 (2008). 
 33. Studies have demonstrated that people often prefer the road of least resistance, will 
not act unless they have to, and tend to maintain the status quo. Thus, people are susceptible 
to defaults. Consider the case of organ donation. Traditionally, organ donation forms require 
people to opt-in. However, studies have shown that in jurisdictions where consent to organ 
donation is the default, the consent rate in much higher than in jurisdictions where the indi-
vidual must opt in in order to donate organs. By using default rules, policymakers are able to 
determine the outcome of cases in which people take no action. See Johnson & Goldstein, su-
pra note 6, at 1338–39; Lehner et al., supra note 30, at 169. 
 34. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, NUDGE, supra note 2, at 53–74. 
 35. Kiran Iyer, Nudging Virtue, 26 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 469, 481 (2017); Anne-Lise 
Sibony & Alberto Alemanno, The Emergence of Behavioral Policy-Making: A European Per-
spective, in NUDGE AND THE LAW: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 4 (Anne-Lise Sibony & Alber-
to Alemanno eds. 2015). 
 36. See, e.g., John Beshears et al., The Effect Of Providing Peer Information On Re-
tirement Savings Decisions, 70 J. FIN. 1161 (2015). 
 37. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, NUDGE, supra note 2, at 54. 
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ble,” she is more likely to alter her behavior “to earn social approval and 
avoid disapproval.”38 Further, because most people believe that others are 
paying attention to what they are doing, if an individual cares about what 
other people think of her, then she is more susceptible to go along with the 
norm.39 This is illustrated in Solomon Asch’s classic conformity experiment. 
In this experiment participants were presented with three lines (A, B, or C) 
and were asked to judge and verbally announce which one of those lines 
was most like a fourth “target line.”40 The task was fairly easy, and the an-
swer was rather obvious. However, each participant was put in a room with 
seven other participants that were in fact coconspirators. These seven con-
federates had agreed in advance on the answer they would provide, but the 
naïve participant was unaware. Asch found that naïve participants were 
willing to ignore reality and conformed to the incorrect majority answer.41
While this might seem anecdotal, studies on exercise, smoking, drugs, teen-
age pregnancy, obesity, risk-taking, health, and many other areas of life 
have similarly found that the perceived salient decisions of others have a 
significant impact on individual choices.42
The overall message is clear. As people tend to rely on social norms to 
“gain an accurate understanding of and effectively respond to social situa-
tions,”43 informing them or emphasizing what most people should do or ac-
tually do in certain circumstances (i.e., the social norm) has the potential to 
change their behaviors.44 Moreover, it could create a phenomenon of “com-
 38. Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51
STAN. L. REV. 683, 686 (1999); see also Hunt Allcott, Social Norms and Energy Conserva-
tion, 95 J. PUB. ECON. 1082, 1083 (2011); Johnson & Goldstein, supra note 6, at 1338. 
 39. This phenomenon is known as the Spotlight Effect. See THALER & SUNSTEIN,
NUDGE, supra note 2, at 54. 
 40. Id. at 55–57. 
 41. Id.
 42. Id. at 54–55; Cass R. Sunstein, Nudges.gov: Behaviorally Informed Regulation, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 719, 723 (Eyal Zamir 
& Doron Teichman eds., 2014) [hereinafter Sunstein (2014)]. 
 43. Robert B. Cialdini & Noah J. Goldstein, Social Influence: Compliance and Con-
formity, 55 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 591, 597 (2004). 
 44. To that end, it is common to differentiate between two types of norms which poli-
cymakers might deploy: injunctive and descriptive norms. The first communicate what people 
ought or should do. Whereas, the latter communicates “what most people do.” Robert Cialdini 
et al., A Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: Recycling the Concept of Norms to Reduce Lit-
tering in Public Spaces, 58 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1015, 1015 (1990); Yuval 
Feldman & Janice Nadler, The Law and Norms of File Sharing, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 577, 
598 (2006) (“Descriptive norms are how most people would behave in comparable situations. 
Injunctive norms refer to the extent to which most people would approve of the target behav-
ior.”). Both injunctive and descriptive social norms are used as nudges. Elena Kantorowicz-
Reznichenko & Jaroslaw Kantorowicz, To Follow or not to Follow the Herd? Transparency 
and Social Norm Nudges 6 (Inst. for Res. in Econ. & Fiscal Issues, Working Paper No. 
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pliance without enforcement.”45 Social norm nudge techniques make use of 
these precise insights. 
Government and private entities use social norm nudges across various 
domains, including education,46 health,47 and energy and water conserva-
tion.48 For example, in one of largest-scale energy saving experiments using 
social norms, the U.S. power company Opower implemented a nudge tai-
lored to the relevant consumer. Opower sent Home Energy Reports to 
600,000 households. The Home Energy Reports contained information on 
the individual’s energy usage, as well as peer comparison information (i.e., 
tailored nudges). The letters were customized to inform recipients about 
their energy consumption levels in comparison to other people in similar 
situations.49 Additionally, the personalized reports depicted smiley faces and 
associated attributes.50 Overall, these personally tailored messages led to a 
decrease in energy consumption.51
This level of personalization, however, is not always possible. As such, 
there are instances where the nudging entity must resort to generic messages 
to elicit a behavioral change (i.e., non-tailored nudges). For instance, schol-
ars have demonstrated that posting a generic sign near the elevators stating 
that most people took the stairs caused the number of individuals who used 
the elevator versus the stairs to drop by 46%.52 This finding demonstrates 
that even simple “non-tailored” descriptive norm nudges can promote desir-
able social outcomes. 
It is true that there might be some differences in the steps, requirements 
and nudging elements of a “tailored” versus “non-tailored” nudge. Howev-
201901, 2019), https://en.irefeurope.org/Publications/Working-Paper-Series/article/To-
Follow-Or-Not-To-Follow-The-Herd-Transparency-And-Social-Norm-Nudges. 
 45. Rainer Baisch, Nudging: Information, Choice Architecture and Beyond, in
NUDGING – POSSIBILITIES, LIMITATIONS AND APPLICATIONS IN EUROPEAN LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 217, 228 (Klaus Mathis & Avishalom Tor eds., 2016); Sunstein (2014), supra
note 42, at 723.
 46. See Benjamin L. Castleman & Lindsay C. Page, Summer Nudging: Can Personal-
ized Text Messages and Peer Mentor Outreach Increase College Going Among Low-Income 
High School Graduates?, 115 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 144, 158 (2015). 
 47. Jerry M. Burger & Martin Shelton, Changing Everyday Health Behaviors Through 
Descriptive Norm Manipulations, SOC. INFLUENCE 1, 1 (2011). 
 48. Maria Bernedo, Paul J. Ferraro & Michael Price, The Persistent Impacts of Norm-
Based Messaging and Their Implications for Water Conservation, 37 J. CONSUMER POL’Y
437 (2014). 
 49. Allcott, supra note 38. One problem with this assertion is that the term “similar sit-
uation” can have different interpretations. Opower compared house square footage and heat-
ing systems. Id. at 1083. 
 50. Id.
 51. This outcome is undoubtedly beneficial to both the individual who is saving money 
and society as whole, as it will help to reduce pollution. Sunstein (2014), supra note 42, at 
740.
 52. Burger & Shelton, supra note 47, at 1. 
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er, based on the examples reviewed, it is possible to conclude that employ-
ing social norm nudges (whether by the state or a private entity) generally 
requires the collection and processing of information from which the nudg-
ing entity could deduce the applicable social norm. This information is sub-
sequently used to signal to a specific individual or group of individuals what 
is the desired or socially acceptable behavior, thus opening up the possibil-
ity for privacy concerns. 
The growing popularity of social norm nudges brought attention to both 
the advantages and drawbacks of this instrument. However, to the best of 
our knowledge, research on privacy implications of them remains sparse. 
These concerns are to be discussed in the next part. 
III. Can Social Norm Nudges Pose a Threat to Privacy? 
An individual’s right to privacy was recognized for the first time by 
Samuel D. Warren and Louis T. Brandeis in their 1890 seminal article titled 
“The Right to Privacy.”53 Seventy years later, William Prosser further ad-
vanced the legal protection of privacy by identifying four separate torts 
within the “right of privacy.”54 In the years that followed, the right to priva-
cy has become a key element in the ensemble of constitutional protections 
enjoyed by individuals and has been institutionalized in various ways. Still, 
and despite the richness of the academic literature, there is no consensus re-
garding the theoretical justifications or the scope of the right to privacy.55
 53. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 195–96 (1890). In their article, Warren and Brandeis inspired the discourse pertaining to 
an individual’s right to privacy, which they framed as the “right to be let alone.” Id. “[T]he 
authors concluded that there is a common law right of privacy which had, in some instances, 
been protected under the guise of property rights, and that violation of the right itself is ac-
tionable.” Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858, 860 (Tex. 1973); see also Benjamin E. 
Bratman, Brandeis and Warren’s The Right to Privacy and the Birth of the Right to Privacy,
69 TENN. L. REV. 623, 624–26 (2002) (claiming that Brandeis and Warren’s article “is almost 
universally regarded as the origin of the four invasion of privacy torts” and that judges and 
scholars continue to cite it as “the original source of a privacy right in American law”); Rich-
ard C. Turkington, Legacy of the Warren and Brandeis Article: The Emerging Unencumbered 
Constitutional Right to Informational Privacy, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 479, 484 (1990).
 54. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). 
 55. Derek E. Bambauer, Privacy Versus Security, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
667, 672-73 (2013) (“[s]cholars and courts disagree about virtually everything” related to pri-
vacy); Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2087 (2001) (“Privacy 
is a value so complex, so entangled in competing and contradictory dimensions, so engorged 
with various and distinct meanings, that I sometimes despair whether it can be usefully ad-
dressed at all.”); Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1088-90 
(2002) [hereinafter Solove, Conceptualizing]; Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 
U. PA. L. REV. 477, 485 (2006) [hereinafter Solove, A Taxonomy]. First, there is disagreement 
as to whether privacy is a right in and of itself, or whether it is a label used to protect other 
interests. Second, there is disagreement regarding the values and interests served by privacy. 
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In fact, the concept of privacy is so complex and the literature concern-
ing it is so vast that it cannot be addressed within the confines of this arti-
cle.56 That being said, it is sufficient to note the threats social norm nudges 
pose for privacy. Building on the work of Daniel Solove,57 this article con-
tends that to adequately explore the plausible threats to privacy, one need 
not focus on the attempts to offer an overarching abstract notion of priva-
cy,58 but concentrate on a variety of activities that could be harmful to priva-
cy.59
As noted in the previous section, any attempt to implement social norm 
nudges will include, at minimum, the following three steps: 
The term privacy has been used as an umbrella concept encompassing one’s right to be left 
alone, limited access to the self, secrecy, control over personal information, personhood, and 
intimacy. See Frederick Davis, What Do We Mean by ‘Right to Privacy’, 4 S.D. L. REV. 1 
(1959); Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 422 (1980); Bert-
Jaap Koops & Ronald Leenes, ‘Code’ and the Slow Erosion of Privacy, 12 MICH. TELECOMM.
& TECH. L. REV. 115, 135 (2005); see also Danielle K. Citron & Leslie M. Henry, Visionary 
Pragmatism and the Value of Privacy in the Twenty-First Century, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1107 
(2010); Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law – Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 327 (1966); Tommaso Zeccherini, Privacy: Theoretical Anal-
ysis of the Value of this Concept for Greater Protection of Personal Data, SSRN (March 20, 
2017) http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2965925. 
 56. See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY §5.59 (2d 
ed. 2009); ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY: COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS AND 
DOSSIERS 25 (1971). This could be attributed, at least partially, to the fact that privacy “is a 
product of norms, activities, and legal protections. As a result, it is culturally and historically 
contingent.” Daniel Solove, The Meaning and Value of Privacy, in SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF 
PRIVACY: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 71, 74 (Dorota Mokrosinska & Beate Roessler 
eds., 2015) [hereinafter Solove, The Meaning and Value of Privacy]. See generally Helen Nis-
senbaum, Privacy As Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119, 146–55 (2004) (discussing 
the different values advanced by the right to privacy); Scott Skinner-Thompson, Outing Pri-
vacy, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 159, 178–83 (2015) (discussing privacy and autonomy); Solove, 
Conceptualizing, supra note 55, at 1145–46 (discussing different conceptions of privacy); Li-
or Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 923–25 
(2005) (discussing different theories and values); Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, A Theory of 
Creepy: Technology, Privacy and Shifting Social Norms, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 59, 72–80 
(2013) (discussing privacy values and norms). 
 57. Daniel Solove claims that many scholars have attempted to conceptualize privacy 
by pointing to a common denominator that encompasses what we all view as private. Howev-
er, this method “faces a difficult dilemma. If we choose a common denominator that is broad 
enough to encompass nearly everything, then the conception risks the danger of being over-
inclusive or too vague. If we choose a narrower common denominator, then the risk is that the 
conception is too restrictive.” Solove, The Meaning and Value of Privacy, supra note 56, at 
74.
 58. Solove, A Taxonomy, supra note 55, at 480–82; see also Citron & Henry, supra
note 55, at 1109 (discussing Solove’s book Understanding Privacy). 
 59. This approach, contends Solove, would allow policymakers to make meaningful 
choices and balance privacy concerns against other compelling interests in specific contexts. 
See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 87–89 (2008) [hereinafter SOLOVE,
UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY]. 
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Step 1: Information collection; 
Step 2: Information analysis; and 
Step 3: Information dissemination. 
This multi-stage process broadly corresponds to the first three groups of 
activities included in Solove’s taxonomy of privacy harms (information col-
lection, processing, and dissemination).60 These activities are not all inher-
ently harmful or problematic from a legal standpoint but raise the possibility 
of privacy threats in each step. Thus, these groups of activities are a good 
starting point for assessing the threats social norm nudges pose for privacy. 
Consider the following example. “A-Water,” a city water corporation, is 
interested in promoting water conservation and eliciting a behavioral change 
among its customers. To do so, a member of the corporation’s managerial 
board decided to employ social norm nudges in order to reduce water con-
sumption levels.61 Consequently, the corporation decided to send each 
household a customized monthly report containing information about the 
customer’s monthly water consumption and a comparison of the aforemen-
tioned water usage to the median consumption in the relevant group of his 
neighbors. The members of the relevant group were determined by the com-
pany based on certain characteristics of the household (e.g., address, number 
of rooms, and number of members in the household). As a practical matter, 
in order to implement the desired social-norm nudge, the corporation must 
first collect information regarding their customers’ water consumptions lev-
els, which will be complemented by other attributes. Subsequently, they 
must then process the information, in order to compute the relevant social 
norm and determine the relevant group of neighbors. Finally, the corpora-
tion will need to communicate the appropriate information to each and eve-
ry household. In each of these stages, the activities performed by the corpo-
ration could potentially pose a threat to privacy. While our article emphasiz-
emphasizes the privacy concerns raised primarily during the last stage, it is 
important to be mindful of all the risks involved in this activity.62
A. Information Collection 
To design a social norm nudge, a corporation must first collect infor-
mation pertaining to the water consumption of its customers as well as their 
 60. Solove divided privacy-offensive activities into four principal groups: (1) infor-
mation collection, (2) information processing, (3) information dissemination, and (4) invasion.
Solove, The Meaning and Value of Privacy, supra note 57, at 77; see also SOLOVE,
UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 59, at 106–70. 
 61. Bernedo, Ferraro & Price, supra note 48, at 437. 
 62. Note that this example is similar to the Opower study and therefore the threats it 
presents are not merely theoretical. Allcott, supra notes 38, 49 and accompanying text. 
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household’s characteristics. Solove identifies two forms of information col-
lection: (1) surveillance and (2) interrogation.63
1. Surveillance 
Surveillance is intrinsically troublesome from a privacy standpoint 
when it involves spying. Solove, however, emphasizes that surveillance 
could encompass a larger set of activities, including watching, listening to, 
or recording an individual.64 These activities would be problematic in some 
contexts, but not in others. For example, when an individual is walking on 
the street, she expects others to watch her as she passes by, and maybe even 
listen to her conversation. When the scrutiny and monitoring are continuous, 
however, these activities are likely to make her feel uncomfortable and anx-
ious.65 In addition to this, constant monitoring has been shown to lead to 
self-consciousness and self-censorship,66 resulting in “a subtle yet funda-
mental shift in the content of our character.”67 Hence, surveillance could 
bring about colossal negative consequences. 
To illustrate these consequences, consider the famous metaphor of the 
Panopticon. The most well-known example is Jeremy Bentham’s proposed 
prison which depicts a prison designed as a circular shape, with an watch-
man siting in a central tower from which he can oversee the activities taking 
place by the inmates in all of the cells.68 By creating the illusion of constant 
surveillance, Bentham’s prison design aimed to deter aberrant practices and 
affect the inmates’ behavior.69 Although seemingly distinct from one anoth-
er, both the Panopticon and social norm nudges employ surveillance tech-
 63. Solove, A Taxonomy, supra note 55, at 491. 
 64. Id. at 491–99. 
 65. See Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places 
and the Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 237–67 (2002). 
 66. Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1193, 1260 (1998); Solove, A Taxonomy, supra note 55, at 498–99; see also Paul M. 
Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1656 (1999) 
(“[P]erfected surveillance of naked thought’s digital expression short-circuits the individual’s 
own process of decisionmaking.”). 
 67. Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object,
52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1426 (2000). 
 68. The Panopticon, UCL, https://www.ucl.ac.uk/bentham-project/who-was-jeremy-
bentham/panopticon (last visited Sept. 30, 2019). 
 69. See also, DAVID LYON, THE ELECTRIC EYE: THE RISE OF THE SURVEILLANCE 
SOCIETY 62–63 (1994); Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1264, 1267 (2004). In his book Discipline and Punish, Foucault notes 
that the architecture that allows surveillance by the state is a form of power that modifies be-
havior and allows better control. Massimo Sargiacomo, Michel Foucault, Discipline and Pun-
ish: The Birth of the Prison, 13 J. MGMT. & GOVERNANCE 269 (2009). 
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niques in an effort to appraise the individual’s behavior and control it.70 In 
the Panopticon example, the goal was to help identify problematic behaviors 
among inmates. With social norm nudges, the objective is to provide the 
nudging entity with the necessary information to determine whether an indi-
vidual deviates from a certain standard of behavior.71 In our context, A-
Water Corporation must continuously monitor its customers’ water con-
sumption in order to deduce the social norm and whether or not any single 
individual’s behavior deviates from it. Awareness of this continuous moni-
toring might have adverse psychological effects especially if it becomes part 
of a wider surveillance network.72 At the same time, however, these inhibi-
tory effects will enhance the desired outcome of the nudge implemented by 
the corporation.73 Thus, striking a balance between the potential regulatory 
utility of a nudge and individuals’ privacy concerns constitutes an important 
challenge for regulatory agencies. 
Surely, one could maintain that A-Water’s customers gave the corpora-
tion an implicit (if not explicit) authorization to constantly monitor their wa-
ter usage. After all, water companies are authorized to bill consumers for 
water supplied within their network and must monitor water usage in order 
to do so. However, it seems problematic to assume that this consent also ex-
tends to using the information for the purposes of designing a social norm 
nudge. It would prove to be even more problematic as the use of social 
norm nudges increases and spreads to other areas. 
2. Interrogation 
The second form of information collection is interrogation. Interroga-
tion, according to Solove, is a means of acquiring information through com-
pulsion, or pressuring the individual to divulge information.74 Solove clari-
fies that the compulsion need not be direct nor rise to the level of coercion; 
it could be subtle or indirect. For example, subtle interrogation could be 
 70. See James P. Nehf, Recognizing the Societal Value in Information Privacy, 78 
WASH. L. REV. 1, 12 (2003) (“One difference between modern ‘dataveillance’ and the perva-
sive observation of the Orwellian and Panopticon worlds is that we are ‘watched’ not through 
a camera or guard tower, but by a computer collecting facts and data”). 
 71. In this context, one could invoke George Orwell’s “Big Brother” metaphor. This is 
by no means the first utilization of this metaphor as it has been invoked by numerous privacy 
scholars. See e.g., Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1463 
(2000); Nehf, supra note 70, at 10–11; Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Data-
bases and Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1396 (2001) [hereinaf-
ter Solove, Privacy and Power].
 72. Solove, A Taxonomy, supra note 55, at 498–99; Kang, supra note 66, at 1260; 
Schwartz, supra note 66, at 1656. 
 73. For further discussion of personalized nudges, see supra notes 49–52 and accom-
panying text. 
 74. Solove, A Taxonomy, supra note 55, at 499–500. 
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seen in cases in which an individual is forced to answer probing questions 
out of fear of losing her job or suffering social criticism.75 In these scenarios, 
the mere refusal to answer could create an appearance of having something 
to hide, and therefore make the subject feel uncomfortable. Interrogation 
could pose a threat to privacy as it is invasive and often involves the reveal-
ing of private information.76 It is possible to imagine certain instances in 
which the individual will allow data collection for the purpose of social 
norm nudging only to avoid being perceived as “having something to hide.” 
However, out of the two alternatives (i.e., surveillance and interrogation), 
interrogation seems less likely to pose a threat to privacy in the context of 
social norm nudges. 
B. Information Processing 
The second group of activities identified by Solove involves the “use, 
storage, and manipulation of data that has been collected.”77 Namely, five 
forms of information processing: (1) aggregation, (2) identification, (3) in-
security, (4) secondary use, and (5) exclusion.78
1. Aggregation 
Aggregation is combining bits of information about a specific person in 
new ways. The idea is that an isolated piece of information might not be 
very revealing.79 However, when combined, the different pieces could gen-
erate new information about the individual that she did not expect to be re-
vealed about her when the original “isolated” bits of information were gath-
ered.80 For example, imagine an employee in a hauling company. The 
company has integrated a GPS system into their fleet of vehicles in order to 
promote efficiency. The GPS system routinely collects and aggregates in-
formation. From this data, the company can learn how long it takes the em-
ployee to complete his daily route, how long he needs to spend at each stop, 
and so forth. However, through the GPS system, the company can also 
gather information pertaining to the employee’s daily routine and lifestyle. 
The aggregation of information is not, in and of itself, necessarily harmful. 
It could, in fact, serve a wide array of positive purposes. It does, however, 
carry broad implications for privacy, especially when the information is in-
complete or disconnected from the original context in which it was gath-
 75. See id. at 500–02. 
 76. Id.
 77. Id. at 504. 
 78. Id. at 505. 
 79. Id. at 507. 
 80. Id. at 507-08. 
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ered.81 In those instances, the information could misrepresent and mischar-
acterize the individual. 
2. Identification 
Identification goes an additional step beyond aggregation, by linking 
the information to a particular individual.82 As in the case of aggregation, 
identification could have some benefits for the individual who is the subject 
of the information collection; for instance, it can assure that only she can 
access her records. At the same time, identification diminishes the individu-
al’s ability to remain anonymous, which is recognized as an important pillar 
of the right to privacy.83 For example, using a store loyalty card could reveal 
that a particular consumer has gone through a certain medical procedure or 
has a specific medical condition.84
To better illustrate how aggregation and identification activities could 
pose a threat to privacy in the context of social norm nudges, let us return to 
our water corporation example. Aggregating information concerning cus-
tomers’ water usage is a critical component of A-Water’s plan. The compa-
ny must accumulate and combine different bits of information to form a por-
trait of each household’s water consumption, as well as to deduce the social 
norm. On the one hand, this portrait could help induce more conscious water 
consumption usage among the company’s customers. On the other hand, 
however, it raises privacy concerns as it involves combining information in 
new ways. The company’s customers likely have some expectations with 
regard to the kind of information the company can collect about them and 
what could be done with the information. They are likely to assume that the 
company monitors their monthly water consumption and that it may have 
access to other personal information (e.g., name and billing information). 
The aggregation could, however, potentially upset these expectations “be-
cause it involves the combination of data in new, potentially unanticipated 
ways to reveal facts about a person that are not readily known.”85
One might argue that in our scenario, the harm to privacy is so marginal 
that it is insignificant, given the fact that the information in question per-
tains to water consumption. However, aggregation and identification may 
result in losses to privacy even when the featuring information seems unim-
portant or detached from the data subject.86 This privacy loss is particularly 
 81. Id. at 507-12. 
 82. Id. at 515. 
 83. Id. at 511-13. 
 84. Adam B. Thimmesch, Tax Privacy?, 90 TEMP. L. REV. 375, 426 n.240 (2018) (cit-
ing Solove, A Taxonomy, supra note 55, at 511–13). 
 85. Solove, A Taxonomy, supra note 55, at 507. 
 86. In this respect, it is important to note the importance of personal information and 
personally identifiable information. For further discussion, see infra Part IV(A). 
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relevant when the information is used to single out a specific person.87 For 
example, if you had an extremely high level of water consumption. This 
harm to privacy will be even more severe if not only your water provider, 
but also your local health care clinic, were to aggregate information in order 
to induce behavioral change, seeing as medical information is generally per-
ceived as highly sensitive. The higher the perceived sensitivity of the infor-
mation, the higher the privacy concerns. 
3. Secondary Use 
Secondary use of information, which was collected and processed for 
one purpose and then later used for another, is an additional source of con-
cern, mainly due to the lack of control one has over their personal infor-
mation.88 Solove further emphasizes that when put into secondary use, the 
information is “removed from the original context in which it was collect-
ed.”89 Thus, the data subject is likely to be misjudged or misunderstood.90
Today, the number of possible secondary uses for personal data is almost 
unlimited. This unlimited potential is what makes the secondary use so 
threatening to the individual.91 A clear example of this type of threat is the 
Cambridge Analytica scandal where the company harvested the personal 
data of 87 million Facebook users without their consent and used it for other 
purposes, including political purposes.92
It is not entirely clear whether processing water usage information for 
the purpose of nudging would constitute a secondary use or not. As will be 
further discussed below, this depends to a large degree on whether or not the 
A-Water’s customers have consented to their information being processed 
for the purpose of implementing social norm nudges. One might argue that 
even if the company’s usage is indeed a secondary use, it does not merit 
consideration because it does not cause actual harm; on the contrary, the 
nudge could help people be more environmentally aware and reduce their 
expenses by reducing their water consumption. Moreover, it could create an 
 87. Thimmesch, supra note 84, at n.240. 
 88. See id. at 381. 
 89. Solove, A Taxonomy, supra note 55, at 522. 
 90. Nehf, supra note 70, at 23–24. 
 91. Id.
 92. Known as the Facebook–Cambridge Analytica data scandal. See Bill Hutchinson, 
87 Million Facebook Users to Find Out if Their Personal Data Was Breached, ABC NEWS
(Apr. 9, 2018), https://abcnews.go.com/US/87-million-facebook-users-find-personal-data-
breached/story?id=54334187; see also Kathleen Chaykowski, Mark Zuckerberg Addresses 
‘Breach Of Trust’ In Facebook User Data Crisis, FORBES, (Mar. 21, 2018), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kathleenchaykowski/2018/03/21/mark-zuckerberg-addresses-
breach-of-trust-in-facebook-user-data-crisis/#72f8c3e367a0.
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inadequate impression of the individual.93 Thus, the potential harm to the 
individual posed by such secondary use, although not financial in nature, 
includes damages to dignity and reputation. This is particularly true given 
the limited efficacy of de-anonymization techniques, as will be further elab-
orated in the next chapter.94 Further, although people might change their be-
havior in response to the company’s secondary use of the information (i.e., 
nudge), it would increase their insecurity. 
4. Insecurity 
Regardless of how much money is invested in data security protocols, 
there is always a possibility of a data breach.95 Over the past few years, the 
number of successful data breaches has continued to rise.96 In fact, data 
breaches have been documented even for very large and successful compa-
nies such as Facebook, Yahoo, and Home Depot.97 Even if the information 
collected and processed is not targeted or abused by thieves, these breaches 
could still cause considerable harm to the data subjects.98 Consider, for ex-
ample, the case of PumpUp, a popular fitness app with over six million us-
ers, which left a server exposed without a password, allowing anyone to ac-
cess users’ health data and private messages.99 This instance did not involve 
a malicious data breach, but it highlights the prevalence of security issues 
today. Insecurity is the name Solove uses to describe this group of privacy 
concerns,100 namely identity theft, security lapses, abuses and other illicit us-
es of information.101 “[I]nsecurity is the injury of being placed in a weak-
 93. Kelsey L. Zottnick, Secondary Data: A Primary Concern, 18 VAND. J. ENT. &
TECH. L. 193, 209 (2015); see also Solove, A Taxonomy, supra note 55, at 520–21. 
 94. For further discussion, see infra Part IV(A). 
 95. Adam R. Pearlman & Erick S. Lee, National Security, Narcissism, Voyeurism, and 
Kyllo: How Intelligence Programs and Social Norms Are Affecting the Fourth Amendment, 2 
TEX. A&M L. REV. 719, 762 (2015). 
 96. See Ponemon Institute, 2018 Cost of a Data Breach Study: Global Overview 3 (July 
2018), https://www-01.ibm.com/common/ssi/cgi-bin/ssialias?htmlfid=55017055USEN. 
 97. See Daniel J. Marcus, The Data Breach Dilemma: Proactive Solutions for Protect-
ing Consumers’ Personal Information, 68 DUKE L.J. 555, 556 (2018). 
 98. The Ponemon Institute defines a data breach as “an event in which an individual’s 
name and a medical record and/or a financial record or debit card is potentially put at risk — 
either in electronic or paper format. In our study, we identified three main causes of a data 
breach: malicious or criminal attack, system glitch, or human error. The costs of data breach 
vary according to the cause and the safeguards in place at the time of the data breach.” See 
Ponemon Institute, supra note 96, at 8. 
 99. Zack Whittaker, Fitness App PumpUp Leaked Health Data, Private Messages
(May 31, 2018), https://www.zdnet.com/article/fitness-app-pumpup-leaked-health-data-
private-messages/. 
 100. Solove, A Taxonomy, supra note 55, at 516–20. 
 101. Id. at 517. 
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ened state, of being made more vulnerable to a range of future harms.”102 In 
other words, the threat to privacy posed by insecurity is connected to future 
injury resulting from inadequate protection of collections of personal data.103
In our context, insecurity may not be a problem when discussing the infor-
mation held by the A-Water Corporation, as it hard to imagine thieves aim-
ing to steal one’s water consumption data. But if the corporation does not 
take the necessary steps to protect the collected data, in the case of a data 
breach, the overall information stored by the company can be accessed and 
read by third parties. Such information includes sensitive information such 
as customers’ names, home addresses, social security numbers, marital sta-
tus, and bank account information.104
5. Exclusion 
The last form of information processing discussed by Solove is exclu-
sion. Exclusion is “the failure to provide individuals with notice and input 
about their records.”105 Solove claims that exclusion distances the individual 
from the data collected about her, and therefore creates a sense of defense-
lessness, similar to secondary use of data and insecurity.106 This is likely to 
pose a major problem in instances where the nudging party might not want 
the target of the nudge to be aware of the information collection and pro-
cessing, as that knowledge might affect their behavior. 
From a legal standpoint, processing personal information is generally 
prohibited, unless the law expressly allows it. In the EU for example, Arti-
cle 6 of the General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) sets the six law-
ful bases for processing information.107 If no lawful basis is applicable, the 
data controller should seek consent from the data subject. The basic condi-
tions for a valid legal consent are defined in Article 7 and specified further 
in recital 32 of the GDPR.108 In particular, any request for consent must be 
 102. Id. at 519. 
 103. Id. at 517–18. 
 104. It could also be the reason for other harms identified by Solove, as will be dis-
cussed below (e.g., intrusion, breach of confidentiality, disclosure, exposure, identification, 
and blackmail). See infra Part III(C). 
 105. Solove, A Taxonomy, supra note 55, at 523. 
 106. Id. at 523–24. 
 107. Among these are: if the processing is necessary to carry out the data controller’s 
contractual or legal obligations, if the processing is necessary for the performance of a task 
which is in the public interest, and if the processing is necessary for the data controller’s legit-
imate interests or the legitimate interests of a third party. See Commission Regulation 
2016/679, art. 6, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the Pro-
tection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free 
Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regula-
tion), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 7–10 [hereinafter Commission Regulation 2016/679]. 
 108. Id. at 6. 
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clear and in plain language. One of the key requirements is that consent be 
informed and specific. Consequently, data subjects must, at least, be in-
formed about the data controller’s identity, what kind of data is being pro-
cessed, the purpose of processing, and how the information will be used.109
In contrast, in the United States there is no comprehensive, all-
embracing regulation which deals with information privacy or data pro-
cessing and sharing.110 Instead, there is a combination of federal and state 
laws, many of which are sector-specific, and therefore apply only to a par-
ticular category of data, such as health or financial information.111 Other 
laws apply to a specific activity, such as telemarketing and commercial e-
mails.112 Given the wide diversity of data protection and privacy statutes, it 
is hard to argue that consent is always required in the United States. Never-
theless, it is a key factor in many of the statutes.113
Under these circumstances, a reasonable approach is to require the 
nudging entity to get the consent of its target population for the data pro-
cessing. While a thorough review of the literature addressing this issue is 
well beyond the scope of this article, it is worth mentioning that regardless 
of the standard used, the idea of informed consent as a way to circumvent 
 109. Id. at 8. In addition, they need to be informed of their right of withdrawal. There-
fore, silence or inactivity would not be considered sufficient to indicate consent for infor-
mation processing. Id. at 37. 
 110. See Paul Ohm, Sensitive Information, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 1125, 1129–30 (2015). 
 111. See, e.g., Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996); Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 
(1970) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681); Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, 
Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952 (2003); Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-728 (1998); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 
106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999); see also Julia Palermo, You Say “Tomato,” I Say “Tom-
ahto”: Getting Past the Opt-in v. Opt-out Consent Debate between the European Union and 
United States, 9 GEO. MASON J. INT’L COM. L. 121, 133 (2017). In addition, there are two 
federal informational privacy law that have a more general scope, “[t]he Privacy Act of 1974, 
5 U.S.C. §552a (2006), and the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA), 
Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2581 (1998). The scope of the former is determined according 
to the context and the identity of the parties: the government and citizens. The scope of the 
latter is determined according to the age (under 13) of the data subjects.” Michael Birnhack, 
Reverse Engineering Informational Privacy Law, 15 YALE J.L. & TECH. 24, 56 (2012). 
 112. See Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New 
Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1831–36 (2011) 
[hereinafter Schwartz & Solove (2011)]; Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, Reconciling 
Personal Information in the United States and European Union, 102 CAL. L. REV. 877, 889 
(2014) [hereinafter Schwartz & Solove (2014)]. 
 113. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID
CHANGE 55–60 (2012); Daniel L. Macioce, Jr., PII in Context: Video Privacy and a Factor-
Based Test for Assessing Personal Information, 45 PEPP. L. REV. 331, 341 (2018); Schwartz 
& Solove (2011), supra note 112, at 1825, 1829. 
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the protection of information is not without criticism.114 In fact, in certain 
circumstances, such as when an individual is seeking medical care, the so-
called informed consent is virtually meaningless because of the underlying 
power disparities.115 Furthermore, most people rarely read standard data con-
tracts.116
Suppose that in our previous example, the A-Water’s customers have 
consented to its information processing practices when signing the compa-
ny’s service contract. However, if a customer did not negotiate the terms of 
service and, in effect, has no other choice but to accept the terms if she 
wants to be connected to the city’s water-supply system, it is questionable 
whether her consent was indeed “informed consent.” Moreover, although 
consent is an important feature of privacy and data protection laws, it is un-
clear whether the fact that the customer consented to the collection of in-
formation for the purposes of water supply, or other services granted by a 
corporation, means that she consents to the processing and communicating 
of this information for the purpose of nudging.
In sum, the processing of information required for the implementation 
of the social norm nudge could pose a threat to privacy, particularly if A-
Water Corporation does not take adequate steps to protect the data. Privacy 
failures have happened in the past and, in all probability, will happen again 
in the future. Personal information has been commodified into a tradable as-
set in the last few decades. Even though the data collection and processing 
in our example was intended to help customers by inducing greater aware-
ness of their water consumption, the information collected, aggregated, and 
created by our hypothetical water company could have unintended negative 
consequences. For example, the information could end up in the hands of 
hackers or thieves. Further, the compilation of information could be used in 
other settings, not all of which are related to the one for which the data sub-
ject agreed to share his or her information. Hence, information processing 
can become what Solove describes as an “architecture[] of vulnerability,” 
which places the individual in a position of weakness.117 Overall, because 
the data subjects have no means to check or validate the accuracy of the in-
formation, they are likely to feel vulnerable. This vulnerability would be in-
 114. See Mark MacCarthy, New Directions In Privacy: Disclosure, Unfairness and Ex-
ternalities, 6 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 425, 427 (2011); Aleecia McDonald & Lau-
rie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y
543, 544 (2008); Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortress or 
Frontier for Individual Rights?, 44 FED. COMM. L.J. 195, 212 n.87 (1992); Solove, Privacy
and Power, supra note 71, at 1454. 
 115. “When people seek medical care, among the forms they sign are general consent 
forms which permit the disclosure of one’s medical records to anyone with a need to see 
them.” Solove, Privacy and Power, supra note 71, at 1454. 
 116. Solove, A Taxonomy, supra note 55, at 520. 
 117. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 60, at 178. 
Fall 2019] Privacy Preserving Social Norm Nudges 65 
creased, and even more evident, if our social norm nudge was to be imple-
mented by an entity operating in areas such as education, health or financial 
markets.
However, collecting and processing information alone will not, and 
cannot, help A-Water “push” its customers to consume less water. For the 
company to induce a change in behavior it must influence what the custom-
ers perceive to be the prevailing social norm or social custom. In other 
words, the company ought to communicate information concerning the par-
ticular household’s individual water consumption and the median water 
consumption of the neighborhood. This comparison is a major element in 
any social norm nudge, and one that is at the heart of our discussion.
C. Information Dissemination 
The third group of harmful activities refers to activities which “involve 
the spreading or transfer of personal data or the threat to do so.”118 These ac-
tivities include breach of confidentiality, disclosure, exposure, increased ac-
cessibility, blackmail, appropriation, and distortion. This is where a rather 
interesting dynamic that is not often talked about can amplify the threat to 
privacy posed by social norms nudges. 
1. Disclosure and Breach of Confidentiality 
A disclosure consists of two elements: (1) the release of true infor-
mation about the individual to third parties and (2) the influence of such 
disclosure on people’s evaluation of the targeted individual.119 When infor-
mation about an individual is made public and she is no longer able to keep 
it secret, there is a chance it will humiliate her, damage the trust she has for 
authority, harm her reputation, or deter others from associating with her.120
Breach of confidentiality involves not only dissemination of information, 
but betrayal. When individuals entrust their information with a specific enti-
ty, be it the government, the city’s water corporation or the bank, they are 
doing so with an understanding (either explicit or implicit) that their infor-
mation will be kept confidential.121 When there is a breach of confidentiality, 
this promise is broken, and the individual may consequently feel de-
ceived.122
When implementing a social norm nudge with the aim to increase or 
decrease the likelihood of engaging (or not) in a particular behavior, the 
nudging entity could place the individual under scrutiny by her peers for 
 118. Solove, The Meaning and Value of Privacy, supra note 56, at 78. 
 119. Id. at 78–79. 
 120. Solove, A Taxonomy, supra note 55, at 546. 
 121. Id. at 527. 
 122. See Solove, The Meaning and Value of Privacy, supra note 56, at 78–79. 
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noncompliance with the social norm. Thus, the nudging entity may be indi-
rectly responsible for those negative social consequences that might follow 
the communication of information about the individual.123 This article ar-
gues that these harms are particularly prevalent when it comes to social 
norm nudges. This is because the nudging entity, in the process of designing 
the nudge, not only disseminates information but also redraws the line be-
tween a normal, or acceptable, social behavior and an abnormal behavior. 
To illustrate, take David and Rose. They are clients of the city water 
corporation and have been living in the same house for the last five years 
with their daughter. The couple has always considered themselves to be an 
environmentally-conscious household. They recycle, purchase energy-
saving appliances and use environmentally-friendly household and personal 
hygiene products. David and Rose also publicly advocate for more envi-
ronmentally-aware consumption and are actively involved in protests and 
demonstrations to raise awareness of the environment. Last month, they re-
ceived the first monthly bill following the implementation of the social 
norm nudge by A-Water Corporation. According to the information present-
ed in the monthly bill, the couple learned that their household is consuming 
a substantially higher level of water in comparison to what is considered to 
be the social norm (i.e., median consumption). 
Revealing the couple’s water consumption in comparison to the median 
water consumption – what is considered to be socially acceptable – espe-
cially in times of drought, could have a negative impact on their reputation 
and the way they are perceived by their community.124 In other words, A-
Water’s dissemination of information could place the couple under scrutiny 
by their peers for noncompliance with the social norm. As a consequence, it 
could profoundly affect their self-image and self-esteem. Even the disclo-
sure of the median consumption level, without revealing individual water 
consumption, could pose a threat to David and Rose’s privacy. Suppose that 
following the implementation of A-Water’s nudging program, it emerged 
that the water consumption of the residents of David and Rose’s neighbor-
hood was significantly higher than other neighborhoods. People who be-
 123. “The more difficult issues arise not with informational nudges designed to engage 
the audience on a conscious, cognitive level, but with nudges that work on a sub-conscious or 
emotional level.” Mark Schweizer, Nudging and the Principle of Proportionality, in
NUDGING-POSSIBILITIES, LIMITATIONS AND APPLICATIONS IN EUROPEAN LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 93, 99 (2016). Further, as Solove’s taxonomy demonstrates, there are other digni-
tary harms beyond reputational injury, namely lack of respect and emotional anxiety. Solove,
A Taxonomy, supra note 55, at 486. 
 124. Commonly, social shaming and ostracism are not directly attributable to the state. 
However, when implementing a social norm nudge with the aim to induce a certain behavior, 
the state could be indirectly responsible for those negative social consequences. Mark 
Schweizer, Nudging and the Principle of Proportionality, in NUDGING-POSSIBILITIES,
LIMITATIONS AND APPLICATIONS IN EUROPEAN LAW AND ECONOMICS 93, 99 (2016). 
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come aware of this comparison may – rightfully or wrongfully – use this in-
formation to draw conclusions about the couple. As explained by James 
Nehf, “[t]he resulting judgments might be proved correct in the aggre-
gate . . . but they can be unfair in individual cases.”125
Implementing this type of nudge, without proper consent, could be con-
sidered a breach of confidence. To demonstrate this, let us return to Rose 
and David. At first, Rose and David decline to believe this information. 
They even called the water company’s customer service to check whether 
there were leaks or any other technical problems. When no issues were 
found, they realized that they were not as environmentally aware as they 
thought themselves to be, which consequently affected their self-image. At 
the same time, they began wondering what else the company might be using 
their information for and who else might have access to it. When initially 
contracting with A-Water Corporation, they were under the impression that 
the company would utilize the information they provided primarily to moni-
tor their monthly water consumption and generate a monthly bill. But more 
than that, they implicitly (or explicitly) trusted the company to protect their 
information. Now that the company has begun to send personalized messag-
es, they feel that the company has breached their confidentiality. Not only 
that, but they started dreading the possibility that one of their neighbors, or 
members of their activist group, would find out about their high-water con-
sumption levels.126
In marketing, the use of personalized or targeted advertising has been 
found to raise consumers’ privacy concerns; however, firms that were able 
to provide consumers with some control over their personally identifiable 
information were more likely to attract consumers through targeted ads.127
This suggests that if people realize that their personal usage information is 
being used for creating the social-norm nudge, they might react against the 
firm in a way which could jeopardize the effects of social-norm nudge.128 If 
individuals were to lose trust in governments or other public institutions 
which deploy social norm nudges, this would have a negative impact on the 
efficacy of social norm nudges, especially in times where the proliferation 
of “fake news” and misinformation lead to increasingly public skepticism.129
 125. Nehf, supra note 70, at 25. 
 126. Solove classifies wrongful disclosure as “spreading information beyond expected 
boundaries” that can potentially risk the reputation of a person. See Solove, A Taxonomy, su-
pra note 55, at 532. 
 127. See Catherine E. Tucker Social Networks, Personalized Advertising, and Privacy 
Controls, 51 5 J. MARKETING RES. 546, 546 (2014). 
 128. But see infra Part V, where we suggest using differential privacy as a way to miti-
gate some of these concerns. 
 129. See Nabiha Syed, Real Talk About Fake News: Towards a Better Theory for Plat-
form Governance, 127 YALE L.J.F. 337, 343 (2017). 
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The idea that David and Rose will feel ashamed and humiliated if their 
neighbors will learn about their excessive water usage might be dismissed 
by some. However, to the extent to which this hypothetical couple includes 
being environmentally-conscious in their self-identity, it is easy to imagine 
how such information will negatively affect their public and self-image, par-
ticularly in the context of online shaming.130 Even further, suppose David or 
Rose decide to run for some governmental office in their city, like city 
mayor. Then, this idea about shaming tactics in the age of social media 
would be even more pertinent. 
2. Exposure, Increased Accessibility, Blackmail,  
Appropriation, and Distortion 
The remaining subcategories of dissemination of information identified 
by Solove are exposure, increased accessibility, blackmail, appropriation, 
and distortion.131 These activities, however, are less applicable to the context 
of social norm nudges and so they will not be discussed further. 
 130. See, e.g., Emily Laidlaw, Online Shaming and the Right to Privacy, 6 LAWS 3, 3
(2017).
 131. Exposure is somewhat similar to disclosure, as it involves revealing information 
about an individual; but, the two subcategories diverge in that exposure does not require re-
vealing information that others will typically use to judge the data subject’s character. Instead, 
it involves the revealing of physical or mental situations that people tend to consider highly 
private (e.g., grief, suffering, trauma, injury, nudity, sex, urination, defecation). Because hu-
man beings have developed social norms concerning these situations, revealing them to others 
often results in embarrassment, humiliation, and a loss of self-esteem. The next subcategory, 
increased accessibility, does not necessary entail direct disclosure of secret information; ra-
ther, it refers to the increased ease in which information already available to the public can be 
accessed by others. Thus, the possible harm is not the result of revealing the information, but a 
matter of it increasing the chances of experiencing other threats to privacy, such as disclosure, 
and the corresponding repercussions. Blackmail refers to the threat of disclosure of personal 
information. It allows the person or persons controlling the information to have power over 
the individual who is the subject of information. Thus, the actual harm is a loss of power and 
is a result of the control held by the person making the threat and does not require the actual 
disclosure or exposure of information. Appropriation involves the use of an individual’s – the 
data subject’s – identity to promote the interests of another person. Like other activities dis-
cussed previously, it raises privacy concerns because it affects the way the individual is able 
to present herself to others. Thus far, we have discussed instances in which privacy concerns 
result from the dissemination and communication of truthful information about individuals. 
Distortion, however, pertains to the dissemination of false or misleading information. It in-
volves purposeful manipulation of the way an individual is presented and perceived by others. 
Solove emphasizes that distortion, like disclosure, involves activities that affect the way the 
individual is perceived by society, and therefore could result in embarrassment, humiliation, 
and reputational harm. Solove, A Taxonomy, supra note 55, at 533–52. 
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D. Invasion 
Solove’s fourth and final group of activities involves invasions into 
one’s private affairs. Solove refers to two forms of invasion: (1) intrusion 
and (2) decision interference.132 Intrusion is an invasion of an individual’s 
private life, whereas decision interference pertains to instances in which the 
state or a third party interferes with an individual’s decisions.133 Under 
Solove’s definition, the utilization of nudging techniques would be catego-
rized as an invasion activity. Although interferences with an individual’s 
decision-making process are commonly criticized as posing a risk to auton-
omy and liberty (not privacy), Solove claims that such interference is deeply 
connected to privacy, emphasizing that the individual’s protected “zone of 
privacy” spreads to the “interest in independence in making certain kinds of 
important decisions.”134
Referring back to our water consumption example, the corporation’s 
collection and dissemination of household and neighborhood water con-
sumption levels, although not coercive in nature, represents both direct and 
indirect attempts to interfere with individuals’ activities (i.e., water usage) 
and decision-making processes (e.g., how often to use water). 
In sum, although social norm nudges would not directly make private 
information public, there could be an unexpected and undesirable impact on 
privacy. Whereas the prevailing analysis in this article focuses mainly on 
pro-environmental behaviors, the principles discussed throughout this article 
are applicable to other social norm nudges that share similar characteristics 
to the ones identified in this article. However, it is important to emphasize 
that the level and type of privacy harm may vary depending on the specific 
nudge employed. It is useful to distinguish in this context between two sce-
narios. 
In the first scenario, the social-norm nudge employed is broad, “non-
tailored,” and descriptive. It includes a general account of the relevant social 
norm and refers to a very large population. For instance, an online adver-
tisement informing the public of the percentage of youth smoking in Tex-
as,135 the maximum number of drinks most college students drink at a par-
ty,136 or the percentage of London youth involved in violent incidents.137
 132. Id. at 552. 
 133. Solove, The Meaning and Value of Privacy, supra note 56, at 78 (claiming that in-
vasion, “unlike the other groupings, need not involve personal information (although in nu-
merous instances, it does)”). 
 134. Solove, A Taxonomy, supra note 55, at 558 (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 
599–600 (1977)). 
 135. The nudge used was: “8 out of 10 Texas teens don’t smoke.” 
Social Norms + Foot Humor = Fewer Teen Smokers in Texas? NUDGE (June 14, 2011),
http://nudges.org/2011/06/14/new-social-norm-campaign-on-teen-smoking-in-texas/.
 136. The nudge used was: “most hoyas have 0-4 drinks when they party.” 
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These nudges, although drawing on social norms, will generally pose a rela-
tively small threat to privacy, if any at all, because it would be almost im-
possible to attribute the information to a specific individual. 
On the other side of the spectrum, there are individually tailored nudg-
es, similar to the one used in the example of A-Water Corporation. As 
demonstrated throughout this chapter, these nudges pose a threat to privacy 
at each and every step of the nudging process. Nevertheless, to date, schol-
ars and policymakers have praised the value of social norm nudges without 
giving the necessary attention to the privacy threats that they pose nor to the 
task of balancing privacy protection with facilitating social norm nudges.138
Although privacy concerns may arise at any stage of the nudging pro-
cess, the next two chapters center mainly on privacy threats raised during, 
and as a result of, the communication of information. Of course, privacy 
concerns that are raised in other stages of the process should not be dis-
missed. Social norm nudges derive the majority of their power from indi-
viduals’ need to belong, their desire to fit in with others, and their fear of 
peers’ negative reactions.139 It is the stage in which the information is no 
longer under the control of the state or a particular authority, rather it is pub-
licly available. Focusing on this stage allows us to examine the use of dif-
ferential privacy to address privacy concerns that arise from the use of so-
cial norm nudges. In particular, it shows how using algorithms can allow a 
regulatory agency to utilize social norm nudges while maintaining individu-
al privacy.140
1. Using Social Norm Nudges – the Perspective of  
Privacy-Regulation
Part III argued that there are certain risks to privacy that are inherent in 
the use of social norm nudges. The degree and scope of these privacy threats 
may vary depending on the type of the nudge implemented, the scope, form, 
and type of information communicated, as well as the number of people in-
We’ll Say It Again. If You’re Trying to Curb Binge Drinking, Use Social Norms NUDGE 
(Mar. 4, 2010), http://nudges.org/2010/03/04/well-say-it-again-if-youre-trying-to-curb-binge-
drinking-use-social-norms/.
 137. The nudge used was: “99% of young Londoners do not commit serious youth vio-
lence.” U.K. Social Norms Campaign to Reduce Youth Violence, NUDGE (Oct. 24, 2010), 
http://nudges.org/2010/10/24/social-norms-campaign-to-reduce-youth-violence-in-london.
 138. See, e.g., Magali A. Delmas & Neil Lessem, Saving Power to Conserve Your Repu-
tation? The Effectiveness of Private Versus Public Information, 67 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT.
353 (2014).
 139. Some of these concerns have been covered extensively in the literature addressing 
information and data security. 
 140. It is important to note that although this paper focuses on potential harms to privacy 
that are entangled in water consumption-related nudging, the presented ideas are relevant to 
broader areas of policy interventions. 
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cluded in the relevant group. These risks are likely to have far-reaching im-
plications in the big-data era.141 In particular, this is so because once infor-
mation is disseminated, it is almost impossible to take it back. However, 
given the many advantages of social norm nudges, the challenge is to devel-
op a framework which could allow regulators to use this instrument while 
providing a reasonable level of privacy protection.142
Currently, the prominent approach for protecting people’s privacy has 
been based on the notion of de-identification. De-identification focuses on 
reducing identifiability: de-identification policies consider information as 
“anonymous” once certain types of personally indefinable information 
(“PII”) has been removed from it. The term “anonymous” suggests that this 
information cannot then be traced back to concrete individuals (“re-
identification”). However, in recent years, scholars have demonstrated that 
de-identification does not guarantee anonymity in various scenarios.143
These limitations of de-identification techniques are particularly relevant to 
social norm nudges, which are inherently based on sharing and communi-
cating information. 
In this context, our main argument is that regulators should adopt a dif-
ferential privacy framework that should serve as the basis for privacy-
preserving social norm nudges. The appeal of this framework is that it 
should enable the regulator to minimize privacy risks and at the same time 
continue using social norm nudges, estimating, ex-ante, the tradeoff be-
tween privacy protection and the efficacy or accuracy of the nudge. 
The remainder of this part identifies the challenges that are involved in 
implementing and relying on de-identification techniques as a means of bal-
ancing the utility of data usage with individual privacy interests. The chap-
ter concludes with demonstration of the advantages of differential privacy 
strategy.
A. De-Identification Techniques 
Privacy laws and policies are driven by the desire to protect individuals 
from harm related to collecting, processing, and disseminating information 
about them. Yet, in various instances policymakers seek to design a way to 
balance the social benefit associated with using private data against the po-
tential harm to the individual’s privacy interests. De-identification is one 
 141. See Micah Altman et al., Practical Approaches to Big Data Privacy Over Time, 8 
INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 29, 31 (2018). 
 142. See Nehf, supra note 70, at 7 (arguing that “in the modern digital world, infor-
mation privacy should be viewed as a societal value justifying a resolution in the public inter-
est, much like environmental policy and other societal concerns, with less emphasis on indi-
vidual self-policing and market-based mechanisms”). 
 143. See, e.g., Andrew G. Ferguson, Big Data Distortions: Exploring the Limits of the 
ABA LEATPR Standards, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 831, 871 (2014). 
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way to strike such a balance.144 De-identification is a term used to describe a 
number of techniques “that organizations can use to remove personal infor-
mation from data that they collect, use, archive and share with other organi-
zations.”145 The aim of these techniques is to maintain the benefits of utiliz-
ing the information while reducing the privacy risks associated with its 
dissemination. 
Privacy and data protection laws around the world vary significantly 
both in scope and in the means of protection that they render. Despite these 
differences, most privacy laws converge around the principle of de-
identification. De-identification is based on one basic assumption: that, in 
the absence of personally identifiable information, there will be no privacy 
harm. In other words, the vast majority of data protection and privacy laws 
determine that private information that has been de-identified falls outside 
the scope of the law, thereby allowing it to be used or disseminated in ways 
that would otherwise be considered a violation of the individual’s right to 
privacy. De-identified information can therefore be circulated legally. Con-
sequently, data controllers, such as our A-Water Corporation example, typi-
cally take measures to modify their datasets and remove or encrypt PII. By 
implementing such de-identification techniques, the data controller suppos-
edly protects the data subjects’ privacy and, at the same time, maintains the 
utility of the data.146
The initial step in any de-identification technique is to delete or replace 
(with pseudonyms or arbitrary data) certain personal identifiers such as 
 144. See Chris Achatz & Susan Hubbard, US vs. EU Guidelines for De-Identification, 
Anonymization, and Pseudonymization, 20 J. INTERNET L. 11 (2017); Nissim et al., supra note
20, at 699–700; Ira S. Rubinstein et al., Data Mining and Internet Profiling: Emerging Regu-
latory and Technological Approaches, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 261, 266, 268 (2008). 
 145. Ira S. Rubinstein & Woodrow Hartzog, Anonymization and Risk, 91 WASH. L. REV.
703, 710 (2016) (quoting Simson L. Garfinkel, De-Identification of Personal Information 1 
(2015), http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2015/NIST.IR.8053.pdf). 
 146. It is important to note that what constitutes personally identifiable information will 
depend on the definition adopted by the statute governing the data at issue. For example, the 
FTC defines personally identifiable information as data which is “reasonably linked to a spe-
cific consumer, computer, or other device.” See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING 
CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES 
AND POLICYMAKERS vii (2012). In contrast, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountabil-
ity Act of 1996 (HIPAA) defines individually identifiable health information as “information 
that is a subset of health information, including demographic information collected from an 
individual.” 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2017). However, it allows health care providers to share the 
information if it satisfies the Privacy Rule’s de-identification standard by removing eighteen 
specified individual identifiers. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(d)(2) (2017); DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUM. SERVS., GUIDANCE REGARDING METHODS FOR DE-IDENTIFICATION OF PROTECTED 
HEALTH INFORMATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE HEALTH INSURANCE PORTABILITY AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY ACT (HIPAA) PRIVACY RULE 7–8 (2012) . 
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names, addresses, and social security numbers from the dataset.147 Hence, a 
key aspect of every de-identification process is to denote personally identi-
fiable information (PII).148 Put simply, if a certain piece of information is 
considered to be personally identifiable information by a specific statute, 
then it is protected by law and generally cannot be revealed, shared, or dis-
seminated. However, if it is not personally identifiable, then it is not pro-
tected by law and can be disseminated without restrictions.149
In the United States, for example, the legislative framework for protec-
tion of PII is comprised of an amalgam of sectorial or context-specific stat-
utes at the federal and state levels.150 These laws and regulations are not 
based on a uniform definition of PII or on a general rule for classifying 
PII.151 Thus, the definition of PII varies depending on the underlying law or 
regulation. For instance, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act (“HIPAA”) protects a person’s health information. The Act allows 
health care provider to satisfy the Privacy Rule’s de-identification standard 
by removing eighteen specified individual identifiers.152 The Family Educa-
tional Rights and Privacy Act (“FERPA”), on the other hand, protects per-
sonally identifiable information in educational records.153 However, FERPA 
 147. See Mike Hintze & Khaled El-Emam, Comparing the Benefits of Pseudonymization 
and Anonymization under the GDPR, 2 J. DATA PROTECTION & PRIVACY 146, 146 (2018). 
 148. Schwartz & Solove (2011), supra note 112, at 1814. 
 149. Id. at 1816, 1819–26. 
 150. See, e.g., Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996); Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 
(1970) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681); Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, 
Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952 (2003); Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-728 (1998); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 
106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999). See also Palermo, supra note 111, at 133. In addition, there 
are two federal informational privacy law that have a more general scope. “[T]he Privacy Act 
of 1974, 5 U.S.C. §552a (2006), and the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 
(COPPA), Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2581 (1998). The scope of the former is determined 
according to the context and the identity of the parties: the government and citizens. The 
scope of the latter is determined according to the age (under 13) of the data subjects.” Birn-
hack, supra note 111, at 56. 
 151. See Yuen Yi Chung, Goodbye PII: Contextual Regulations for Online Behavioral 
Targeting, 14 J. HIGH TECH. L. 413, 420–21 (2014); Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: 
Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1733–34 
(2010) [hereinafter Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy]; Schwartz & Solove (2011), supra note 
112, at 1836; Omer Tene, Privacy Law’s Midlife Crisis: A Critical Assessment of the Second 
Wave of Global Privacy Laws, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1217, 1219 (2013). 
 152. See 45 C.F.R § 164.514(b)(2)(i) (2010). It is important to note that the Privacy Rule 
Safe Harbor provides two de-identification methods: (1) formal determination by a qualified 
expert; or (2) removal of eighteen types of identifiers as well as no actual knowledge by the 
covered entity that the remaining data could be used to identify individuals. See DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra note 146, at 6. 
 153. 34 C.F.R. § 99.30 (2019). 
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authorizes the release of information “after the removal of all personally 
identifiable information.”154
Schwartz and Solove have identified three approaches for defining PII 
in existing statutes: (1) the tautological approach, (2) the non-public ap-
proach, and (3) the specific-types approach.155 Under the tautological ap-
proach, PII is generally defined as any information that identifies a per-
son.156 The advantage of the tautological approach lies in its high flexibility, 
which allows it to be applied to new technological advancements;157 howev-
er, its tautological structure means that it provides no guidance as to the 
meaning of PII because it merely states that “PII is PII”.158 The second ap-
proach, the non-public approach, attempts to define PII by focusing on what 
it is not. Schwartz and Solove argue that it is merely a variant of the tauto-
logical approach.159 They emphasize that the non-public approach is prob-
lematic since it focuses on whether information is public or not, and thus 
fails to take into account whether the information in question is in fact iden-
tifiable.160 The third and last approach is based on a list of specific types of 
information. If the information in question falls into a specified category, 
then it automatically is considered PII and triggers the statute.161 Though this 
approach establishes a clear line with regards to PII, Schwartz and Solove 
emphasize that it can be rather vague and under-inclusive.162 In summary, all 
three approaches are flawed and are likely to lead to ambiguity, uncertainty 
and/or over- or under-protection of information. This lack of clarity may 
make it very difficult for policymakers to devise a credible, effective, and 
practical set of principles for designing privacy-preserving social norm 
nudges. 
Under the European Union’s GDPR, on the other hand, information is 
considered “personal” when it is “relating to an identified or identifiable 
natural person (‘data subject’).”163 Specifically, an identifiable natural per-
son is defined as “one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in par-
 154. 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(b)(1) (2019). 
 155. See Schwartz & Solove (2011), supra note 112, at 1828. 




 159. Id. at 1830 (arguing that “[t]he Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) epitomizes one 
aspect of this approach by defining ‘personally identifiable financial information’ as ‘nonpub-
lic personal information’). 
 160. Id.
 161. Id. at 1831 (illustrating different variations of this approach by discussing Massa-
chusetts’s breach notification statute of 2007, California’s Song-Beverly Credit Card Act of 
1971 and the federal Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) of 1998). 
 162. Id. at 1832. See also Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy, supra note 151, at 1742. 
 163. Commission Regulation 2016/679, supra note 107, at art. 4(1).
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ticular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification num-
ber, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to 
the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social 
identity of that natural person.”164 Recognizing both direct and indirect 
means of identification enables the GDPR to accommodate technological 
advancements and takes into account the expanding abilities of re-
identification techniques.165 This is something that the earlier approaches are 
not quite equipped to do. Another interesting feature of the GDPR is its con-
tinuum of de-identification paradigms. On the one hand, truly anonymized 
information is considered non-identifiable, and therefore falls outside the 
scope of the GDPR.166 Pseudonymized information, on the other hand, may 
be re-linked to an individual using additional information or a key (e.g., 
code or algorithm).167 Therefore, it remains personal data and thus, is subject 
to the GDPR.168
However, in accordance with the GDPR, the obligations to which the 
data controller must adhere are relaxed when it comes to the use of “pseu-
 164. Id.
 165. In that respect, Recital 26 clearly states that “[t]o determine whether a natural per-
son is identifiable, account should be taken of all the means reasonably likely to be used, such 
as singling out, either by the controller or by another person to identify the natural person di-
rectly or indirectly. To ascertain whether means are reasonably likely to be used to identify the 
natural person, account should be taken of all objective factors, such as the costs of and the 
amount of time required for identification, taking into consideration the available technology 
at the time of the processing and technological developments.” Id. at recital 26. 
 166. “The principles of data protection should therefore not apply to anonymous infor-
mation, namely information which does not relate to an identified or identifiable natural per-
son or to personal data rendered anonymous in such a manner that the data subject is not or no 
longer identifiable. This Regulation does not therefore concern the processing of such anony-
mous information, including for statistical or research purposes.” Id.; see also Data Protection 
Working Party, Opinion 05/2014 on Anonymisation Techniques, at 5 (Apr. 10, 2014), 
https://www.pdpjournals.com/docs/88197.pdf. Although, as will be further discussed, numer-
ous scholars have argued that re-identification of anonymized information is possible. 
 167. The GDPR defines pseudonymization as “the processing of personal data in such a 
way that the data can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use of addi-
tional information, provided that such additional information is kept separately and is subject 
to technical and organizational measures to ensure that the personal data are not attributed to 
an identified or identifiable natural person.” Commission Regulation 2016/679, supra note 
107, at art. 4(5); see also Hintze & El-Emam, supra note 147, at 146. 
 168. Commission Regulation 2016/679, supra note 107, at recital 26; see also Hintze & 
El-Emam, supra note 147, at 146; Kimberly A. Houser & W. Gregory Voss, GDPR: The End 
of Google and Facebook or a New Paradigm in Data Privacy?, 25 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 62–
63 (2018); Sophie Stalla-Bourdillon & Alison Knight, Anonymous Data v. Personal Data – A 
False Debate: An EU Perspective on Anonymization, Pseudonymization and Personal Data,
34 WIS. INT’L L.J. 284, 287 (2016); Laura Tarhonen, Pseudonymisation of Personal Data Ac-
cording to the General Data Protection Regulation, REFEREE-ARTIKKELI 10, 11–16, 
https://www.edilex.fi/artikkelit/18073.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2019). 
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donymization of personal data.”169 In sum, under the GDPR the term “per-
sonal information” encompasses a broad range of information types. Conse-
quently, some types of information could constitute personal data under Eu-
ropean law but not under the United States statutes. Still, it is not possible to 
draw a firm line between personally identifiable information and non-
identifiable information, particularly because the distinction between per-
sonally identifiable information and non-identifiable information is, in fact, 
highly context-dependent. 170 The same is true for information that has gone 
through a de-identification process. 
For many years, de-identification techniques were considered the “sil-
ver bullet,” which allowed organizations to collect, process, reuse, and dis-
seminate information while, at the same time, preserving the individual’s 
privacy.171 There is however, ample evidence showing that de-identification 
via anonymization or pseudonymization of personal data is not always able 
to prevent the exposure of individualized data. Consider, for example, Net-
flix’s failed attempt to use anonymization or de-identification techniques as 
a means to protect subscribers’ data, which eventually led to a lawsuit 
against the company for violation of the Federal Video Privacy Protection 
Act along with several other California laws.172 Netflix launched a contest 
that invited the public to compete in developing a better movie-
recommendation algorithm than the one the company was using.173 In order 
to support the developers’ and researchers’ efforts, the company released 10 
million movie rankings by 500,000 customers. The data was anonymized by 
removing personal details and replacing names with random numbers to 
protect the privacy of the recommenders. Just a few weeks after the contest 
had begun, two researchers from the University of Texas announced that 
they were able to identify several Netflix users by comparing their so-called 
“anonymous” reviews in the Netflix dataset to reviews posted on the Inter-
net Movie Database website.174
 169. Elizabeth A. Brasher, Addressing the Failure of Anonymization: Guidance from the 
European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation, 2018 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 209, 214 
(2018).
 170. See supra note 151. 
 171. Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy, supra note 151, at 1736 (“Legislatures have 
deployed a perfect, silver bullet solution—anonymization—that has absolved them of the 
need to engage in overt balancing. Anonymization liberated lawmakers by letting them gloss 
over the measuring and weighing of countervailing values like security, innovation, and the 
free flow of information”); see also OMER TENE & CHRISTOPHER WOLF, THE DEFINITION OF 
PERSONA DATA: SEEING THE COMPLETE SPECTRUM 4 (2013). 
 172. Complaint at 1, Doe v. Netflix, Inc., No. 5:09-cv-05903 (N.D. Cal. Filed Dec. 17, 
2009); see also Nissim et al., supra note 20, at 700–02 (discussing several other examples, 
exposing the vulnerabilities of anonymization techniques across many types of data). 
 173. NETFLIX PRIZE, https://www.netflixprize.com/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2019). 
 174. Bruce Schneier, Why ‘Anonymous’ Data Sometimes Isn’t, WIRED (Dec. 12, 2007, 
09:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/2007/12/why-anonymous-data-sometimes-isnt/; Ryan 
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This Netflix example is by no means an isolated incident. A recent 
study conducted by a group of researchers at Carnegie Mellon University 
demonstrated that an individual’s social security number can be predicted 
based on various datasets, including public datasets and social networks.175
Others have argued that one could re-identify 90% of consumers based on 
the credit transactions of 1.1 million users.176 Several studies published in 
the past decade have pointed out the inherent difficulties of relying on 
anonymization techniques as a way to protect people’s privacy.177 Paul Ohm 
argues that anonymization techniques have become ineffective in balancing 
the protection of individuals’ privacy with the utility of data.178 According to 
Ohm, policymakers and technologists adopted the idea that de-identification 
techniques “could robustly protect people’s privacy by making small chang-
es to their data”; Ohm argues that this assumption is flawed.179 Ohm con-
tends that existing technology facilitates the association of anonymized data 
with identifiable information to the point that it is possible to override tradi-
tional anonymization methods.180 He further argues that due to the increased 
accessibility of public, commercial, and other datasets, re-identification has 
become highly feasible. 181 Others have noted that, as the technological ca-
pabilities for inferring information about individuals from aggregated da-
tasets is advancing, the risk to privacy is expected to rise.182
In conclusion, re-anonymization techniques enable third parties to link 
data from other sources to identity the data subject, even when the underly-
Single, Netflix Spilled Your Brokeback Mountain Secret, Lawsuit Claims, WIRED (Dec. 17,
2009, 04:29 PM), https://www.wired.com/2009/12/netflix-privacy-lawsuit/. 
 175. Alessandro Acquisti & Ralph Gross, Predicting Social Security Numbers from Pub-
lic Data, 106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 10975, 10975 (2009). 
 176. Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye et al., Unique in the Shopping Mall: On the Reidenti-
fiability of Credit Card Metadata, 347 SCIENCE 536, 537 (2015); see also Yves-Alexandre de 
Montjoye & Alex “Sandy” Petland, Response to Comment on “Unique in the Shopping Mall: 
On the Reidentifiability of Credit Card Data”, 351 SCIENCE 1274-b (2016). But see David 
Sanchez et al., Comment on “Unique in the Shopping Mall: On the Reidentifiability of Credit 
Card Metadata”, 351 SCIENCE 1274-a (2016) (claiming that “data owners and subjects can be 
reassured that sound anonymization methodologies exist to produce useful anonymized data 
that can be safely shared for research”). 
 177. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Bamberger, Technologies of Compliance: Risk and Regula-
tion in a Digital Age, 88 TEX. L. REV. 669, 716 (2010); Chin & Klinefelter, supra note 20, at 
1426–27; Khaled El Emam et al., A Systematic Review of Re-Identification Attacks on Health 
Data, PLOS ONE (Dec. 2011). But see Jane Yakowitz, Tragedy of the Data Commons, 25 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 8–10, 36–42, 48–50 (2011) (arguing that the re-identification risk has 
been extremely overstated by legal scholars and that imposing “k-anonymity” will sufficiently 
protect the privacy interest in datasets). 
 178. Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy, supra note 151, at 1704–44. 
 179. Id. at 1706–07. 
 180. Id. at 1716–30. 
 181. Id. at 1723–30. 
 182. Nissim and el., supra note 20, at 722–23. 
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ing data would not be classified as “personally identifiable” under existing 
privacy laws.183 Furthermore, even if the underlying information cannot, 
theoretically, directly identify the individual, when multiple data sources are 
combined, re-identification may be possible. These limitations of de-
identification techniques are particularly relevant to social norm nudges, 
which are inherently based on sharing and communicating information.184
Even in situations where the information has supposedly been anonymized, 
it would be nearly impossible for the nudging entity to guarantee that re-
identification is not possible. 
To illustrate the problematic nature of re-identification, suppose that re-
cently, due to reports demonstrating that the level of measles vaccination for 
children has declined for the third successive year,185 the government decid-
ed to use social norm nudges in order to increase vaccination rates. For ex-
ample, suppose that every month parents would be given the latest data on 
vaccination rates, both at the country level (80-90% of US children are fully 
vaccinated by age five) and at the level of their own local community 
(which could be further reduced to school level).186 At first, the disclosure of 
such aggregated information may seem harmless in terms of the risk it poses 
to individuals’ privacy. But suppose that a few months before the last dis-
closure, David and Rose decide to move from one neighborhood to another. 
Imagine that following their move into the new neighborhood, there is a de-
cline in the vaccination rates at the local school. The parents who are in-
formed of this decline may start to worry about the way it could affect their 
children and try to identify the culprit. One way to do so would be to inves-
tigate who, in the community, has recently enrolled their children in the lo-
 183. See Arvind Narayanan & Vitaly Shmatikov, Robust De-Anonymization of Large 
Sparse Datasets, 2008 IEEE SYMP. ON SECURITY & PRIVACY 111, 119, 121. 
 184. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that up until a few years ago, the California 
Public Record Act (“CPRA”), which generally mandates that public records be open to in-
spection by any person, recognizes that the government possesses various types of sensitive 
information about people. And so, this act specifically exempts numerous records from dis-
closure, including “the names, home addresses, telephone numbers, credit histories, and usage 
data of local utility agency customers are also exempt from general disclosure under the 
CPRA.” Scott A. Baxter, Informational Privacy and the California Public Records Act, 30 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 778, 787 (1999); see also CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6254 (West 1998); Ru-
binstein & Hartzog, supra note 145, at 754.
 185. For general discussion and reports regarding measles vaccine rates, see Einav Keet, 
Several US Cities Vulnerable to Measles Outbreaks Due to Declining Vaccination Rates,
CONTAGION LIVE (June 19, 2018), https://www.contagionlive.com/news/several-us-cities-
vulnerable-to-measles-outbreaks-due-to-declining-vaccination-rates; Jacqui Wise, Child Vac-
cination Rates Drop in England as MMR Uptake Falls for Fourth Year, BMJ (Sept. 18, 2018), 
https://www.bmj.com/content/362/bmj.k3967;.
 186. See generally Meng Li & Gretchen Chapman, Nudge to Health: Harnessing Deci-
sion Research to Promote Health Behaviour, 7 SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS
187 (2013); Mark C. Navin, The Ethics of Vaccination Nudges in Pediatric Practice, 29 HEC
F. 43, 45 (2017). 
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cal school. More than that, assuming that the majority of parents in the rele-
vant neighborhood know each other, it would be fairly simple for any inter-
ested neighbor to deduce who, among her neighbors, did not vaccinate their 
children. The social ramifications of such identification could be severe, 
subjecting the family who has not adhered to the “social norm” to various 
social sanctions.187 As this hypothetical example illustrates, the anonymiza-
tion of data does not necessarily preclude a third party from combining ex-
ternal sources of information to infer a particular data subject’s identity.188
The key point is that beyond obtaining explicit consent, policymakers 
should adopt a more effective framework to balance the utility of social 
norm nudges against the potential threat to privacy. This article suggests a 
framework which is not as dependent upon the idea of identifiable infor-
mation and is also less vulnerable to privacy risks emanating from combin-
ing varied external resources. Particularly, the use of “differential privacy” 
algorithms is an effective method for mitigating the risks to privacy via re-
identification.189
B. Differential Privacy as a Tool for Social Norm Nudges Design 
Differential privacy is a mathematical framework for guaranteeing pri-
vacy protection when analyzing data. To illustrate the concept of differential 
privacy, consider again the A-Water Corporation example. Assume that the 
corporation would like to develop a social-norm nudge based on data on 
household water consumption for a specific community consisting of six-
teen households during the month of March 2018. The company first col-
lects the following data: 
 187. For a discussion of vaccinations as a social dilemma and the effect of social nudge 
interventions that aim to increase individuals’ motivation to act in the group’s interest, see
Lars Korn et al., Social Nudging: The Effect of Social Feedback Interventions on Vaccine Up-
take, 37 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 1045 (2018). 
 188. The vulnerability of de-identification techniques has been subject to discussion for 
the past few years. And so, a growing number of legal scholars have called to amend privacy 
and data protection regulations and relax our dependence on de-identification techniques such 
as anonymization and pseudonymization. For example, Ohm, who is one of the biggest critics 
of current de-identification techniques, has recommended several approaches to mitigate pri-
vacy concerns, including disclosing de-identified data only to trusted researchers while, at the 
same time, establishing contractual and/or regulatory restrictions on the uses of such data. See 
Ohm Broken Promises of Privacy, supra note 151, at 1764–69. Paul Schwartz and Daniel 
Solove oppose suggestions that would require reforming the law and the practice. They do, 
however, advocate for modifying and refining the concept of personally identifying infor-
mation. See Schwartz & Solove (2011), supra note 112, at 1883–86; Schwartz & Solove 
(2014), supra note 112, at 877. Others have recently proposed harnessing the advantages of 
differential privacy as a means to lessen the threat of re-identification. See, e.g., Chin & Kline-
felter, supra note 20, at 1427–28. 
 189. Arvind Narayanan, Joanna Huey & Edward W. Felten, A Precautionary Approach 
to Big Data Privacy 11–12 (2015), http://randomwalker.info/publications/precautionary.pdf.
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Table 1: Water consumption in March 2018 (hypothetical) 

















As summarized in Table 1, household number one has consumed 1 cu-
bic meter of water in March 2018, household two consumed 3.4 cubic me-
ters, and so on. After gathering the data, the company is able to process it 
and determine, e.g., that the social norm is the median consumption (which 
equals 7.1 [(7+7.2)/2]). Suppose that customers receive information about 
their own household water consumption, as well as the value of the “social 
norm.” The danger here is that this information (possibly when combined 
with external data sources) might leak information about other consumers. 
For example, suppose that all members of the community, except for the 
residents of household number 9, decide to combine the information they 
received from A-Water Corporation in order to learn about the water con-
sumption of household number 9. By combining their own water consump-
tion data with the median consumption, the community easily learns that 
household number 9 consumed 7.2 cubic meters of water, because this is the 
only possible value that would be consistent with a median of 7.1. 
The idea of differential privacy is to add uncertainty to the computation 
of the social norm, so that even when combining it with the data of all other 
households, every value for the consumption of household number 9 is still 
possible. To achieve this goal, instead of computing the social norm as the 
exact median, the A-Water Corporation computes the social norm by ran-
domly picking an “approximate median.” The requirement of differential 
privacy is that any value of the approximate median (say 6.9) is roughly as 
equally likely to result from the original data (specified in Table 1) or from 
an alternative data set in which the information of household number 9 is 
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replaced with an arbitrarily different value (or removed altogether). This 
means that even if all other households combine the information they re-
ceived from the A-Water Corporation (their own consumption and the ap-
proximate median, say 6.9), then they still cannot deduce essentially any-
thing about the consumption of household number 9. This is because an 
approximate median of 6.9 would be almost as equally likely, no matter the 
water consumption of household number 9. 
It is important to point out here that differential privacy is not a proper-
ty of the approximate median itself, but rather a property of the randomized 
process (or the algorithm) that computed the approximate median.
In more general terms, the differentially private algorithm guarantees 
that a third party cannot learn any more from the information disseminated 
by A-Water than he could have learned had the computation been done 
without the data of any single individual.190 In our scenario, a third party 
might be able to learn that A-Waters’ customers are residents of a specific 
city, say Nashville, but this piece of information could have been deduced 
even if a specific household’s members (i.e., David and Rose) were to opt-
out from the database entirely. 
What the third party will not be able to determine, however, are proper-
ties pertaining to individuals, for example that David and Rose are costum-
ers of A-Water Corporation. 
Certainly, the differential privacy framework will not solve all privacy 
concerns that may arise with regard to social norm nudges, nor will it pro-
tect the individual against unauthorized collection or processing of infor-
mation done by the data controller (i.e., the nudging entity). Additionally, it 
cannot prevent security breaches. The differential privacy framework, how-
ever, will provide an increased level of privacy preservation in comparison 
to leading methods of de-identification.191 It can thus provide regulators – 
whether private or public – with a workable strategy for using social norm 
nudges while protecting privacy.192
Moreover, it is important to note that differential privacy comes at a 
cost to accuracy.193 As previously illustrated, for the company to provide 
David, Rose, and all of the other A-Water customers with protection, it will 
 190. Kobbi Nissim et al. define computation as the “mechanizable procedure for produc-
ing an output given some input data.” Nissim et al., supra note 20, at 696; see also Wood et 
al., supra note 14, at 223. 
 191. TENE & WOLF, supra note 171, at 6. 
 192. It is important to note that differential privacy is a technical definition or a criterion. 
This means that a variety of algorithms could satisfy it. Nevertheless, for a proposed solution 
to satisfy the standard of differential privacy, it must adhere to its mathematical definition. See
Nissim et al., supra note 20, at 714. 
 193. SIMON L. GARFINKEL, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF
COMMERCE, NISTR 8035, DE-IDENTIFICATION OF PERSONAL INFORMATION 8 (2015). 
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need to add statistical noise to obscure personal information.194 In our case, 
if A-Water Corporation is interested in implementing a privacy-preserving 
social norm nudge, it would not be able to use the exact median of con-
sumption, but only a randomized approximation of it. The approximation 
would vary depending on the level of privacy the company wishes to 
achieve and the level of noise added. More privacy means adding more 
noise which, in turn, translates to less accurate computations.195 Stated dif-
ferently, the more privacy the company will attempt to attain, the bigger the 
error the approximation will display. 
This tradeoff between privacy and utility can be adjusted using a priva-
cy-loss parameter, traditionally denoted as . The lower the value chosen for 
•, the more privacy the company can accomplish. This will also create a 
bigger error with regards to the approximate median computed.196 For ex-
ample, in the case of the abovementioned households, if the A-Water Cor-
poration will use 6 m3 as the median (instead of the true 7.1 m3), then five 
households within the relevant group would receive an inaccurate social 
norm nudge. In other words, five households would incorrectly determine 
whether their water level usage was above or below the social-norm (i.e., 
true median). Therefore, we define the error of an approximate median (as 
compared to the true median) as the number of households that would re-
ceive an inaccurate social norm nudge. 
 194. Henry Kenyon, DARPA Research Seeks New Ways to Keep Private Data Anony-
mous, CQ ROLL CALL (Nov. 20, 2018), 2018 WL 6057838; Scripa Els, supra note 20, at 220; 
Wood et al., supra note 14, at 232. 
 195. See Cynthia Dwork & Moni Naor, On the Difficulties of Disclosure Prevention in 
Statistical Databases or the Case for Differential Privacy, 2 J. PRIVACY & CONFIDENTIALITY
93, 103 (2010). 
 196. “A parameter quantified and limits the extent of the deviation between the privacy 
ideal and real world scenarios. . . . The parameter  measures the effect of each individual’s 
information on the output of the analysis. It can also be viewed as a measure of the additional 
privacy risk an individual would incur beyond the risk incurred in the privacy-ideal scenario.” 
See Nissim et al., supra note 20, at 715. 
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Figure 1: An illustration for the error of an  
approximate median. 
Social norm nudges create something similar to “peer pressure” which 
is meant to induce “desirable” behavior. If a large number of people will be 
inaccurately “nudged,” it will undoubtedly affect the overall efficacy of the 
nudge – as a means to induce water conservation.197 This effect, however, is 
less pronounced in larger groups, or groups where the distribution is less 
dense around the median, because noise wouldn’t affect the median approx-
imation as much with more data points available. 
As an example, consider real data obtained from a city with 10,013 
households.198 The “real” median based on the water consumption in the city 
is 22.3 m3 (cubic meter). 
If the corporation chooses to implement a differentially private algo-
rithm, it will need to determine ex-ante what level of privacy it aims to 
achieve and, consequently, what privacy-loss parameter to deploy. Recall 
that the error will depend, to a large degree, on the company’s choice for the 
privacy-loss parameter .199 This example demonstrates the effect of priva-
cy-loss parameters on the accuracy of nudging in a dataset containing 
10,013 households, using two measures of the privacy-loss parameter epsi-
lon: 1=0.05; 2=1, where 1=0.05 represents a high level of privacy and 
2=1 denotes a lower level of privacy. 
 197. See Wood et al., supra note 14, at 204. 
 198. We received this data from an Israeli water corporation for the purpose of this pa-
per.
 199. Wood et al. recommend a range of 0.01-1 for •. Wood et al., supra note 14, at 252. 
7.1 
The sixteen dots represent the water consumption of sixteen house-
holds, and their (exact) median is 7.1. An approximate median of 6 has 
error 5 since there are 5 points (the black points) that are bigger than this 
approximate median even though they are smaller than the true median.  
6
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Table 2: Examples using two variants of privacy-loss 
parameters:200
2= 1 1= 0.05 
0 31 Households receiving false nudge
0 m3 0.03 m3 Gap between false median and real one
0% 0.31% Percentage of households with false 
nudge
As displayed in Table 2, even when using a relatively high level of pri-
vacy protection (i.e., =0.05), the occurrence of a false nudge arises only for 
0.31% of the customers. Meaning that out of the 10,013 households, only 31 
received a false nudge. 
Notwithstanding the above, it is important to note that two other param-
eters could also affect the aforementioned error. First, due to the fact that 
the computation is randomized, different execution may result in different 
outcomes, and it could be, for example, that with some very small probabil-
ity the error is large. This un-confidence level, referred to as the failure 
probability, is traditionally denoted as .201 To better understand this con-
cept, consider the following thought experiment. 
When we flip a coin, we have a 0% chance of flipping nothing, a 50% 
chance of flipping heads, a 50% chance of flipping tails, and a 100% chance 
of flipping something, heads or tails. This is all very intuitive. 
Let us suppose that we flip a coin 1000 times. Even though the expected 
number of heads is 500, the probability of actually getting exactly 500 heads 
is quite small. Nevertheless, we can be “pretty sure” that the number of 
heads will be between 450 and 550. Actually, this fails to be the case with 
probability at most 0.02. We can be even more confident that the number of 
heads will be between 440 and 560, as this fails to be the case with probabil-
ity at most 0.0015. The point here is that by making a “looser” statement, 
we can be more confident that it holds. 
 200. Due to the fact that the computation is noisy, different executions may result in dif-
ferent outcomes, and the values in the table reflect the outcome we obtained after a single ex-
ecution (with the appropriate parameters). As will be made clear later, our algorithms are ac-
companied by a theoretical analysis providing worst case bounds on the error. The values in 
the table are well within these guaranteed bounds. 
 201. It is important to emphasize that in the computer science literature, this parameter is 
called the “confidence parameter” even though bigger values of it correspond to less confi-
dence. To accentuate this, we refer to  as the “un-confidence parameter.” Similarly, the pa-
rameter  is commonly referred to as the “privacy parameter.” However, throughout this paper 
it is titled the “privacy-loss parameter” to emphasize the fact that smaller values of it corre-
spond to more privacy. 
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Returning to our example, smaller values for  mean that our bounds 
hold with higher probability, but result in looser error bounds. Intuitively, 
we can think of  as 1/1000000. Again, this means that with small probabil-
ity (at most 1/1000000) the actual error incurred might be bigger than the 
bounds stated next. Such a small probability of “failure” is standard. In ad-
dition to the privacy-loss parameter  and the failure probability , at least 
in some cases the error also depends on the way in which we discretize the 
resulting approximation of the median. To better illustrate this concept, re-
call that, in the above example, the true median for the relevant group of 
customers is 7.1. Now consider the following two scenarios. In the first sce-
nario, the city water company wants an approximate median which is a nat-
ural number between 1 and 15. In the second scenario, they want an approx-
imate median in that range which is a multiplication of 0.1 (i.e., a number 
from 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 1, 1.1, 1.2, . . ., 14.9, 15). That is, in the first scenario 
they aim to choose the approximate median from one of fifteen possible 
values and, in the second scenario, from 150 possible values. On the one 
hand, our discretization itself might incorporate errors into our estimation. 
To illustrate this idea, in the first scenario we can never identify a median 
with an error of zero (since a median with an error of zero cannot be an in-
teger). On the other hand, it turns out that privately choosing an approxi-
mate median becomes harder (i.e., requires more noise) when our discretiza-
tion contains more points. The reason for this increased difficulty is that an 
approximate median with higher precision contains (potentially, at least) 
more information about the data; hence, it requires more noise to be re-
leased privately. For example, deciding which of two numbers (say, 3 or 6) 
is a better choice for the median reveals very little information about the da-
ta (this is basically a single yes/no question), while identifying an approxi-
mate median with high precision necessitates much more information.202
The lesson from this example is that by discretizing the set of possible 
outputs (approximations for the median), the water company will inevitably 
incur one of these two types of errors. The first type, which we will call the 
discretization error, simply follows from the fact that A-Water’s discretiza-
tion might fail to contain a good choice for the median. This type of error 
becomes smaller if the company decides to use more points in the discreti-
zation. The second type of error follows from the fact that, to ensure priva-
cy, the company ought to add more noise if the discretization contains more 
points. This type of error becomes larger if A-Water uses more points in the 
discretization. To further illustrate this concept, we will provide an example 
in which the number of points in the discretization will be denoted as X and 
X will equal 1000. Experiments with real data show that this number is a 
 202. See Mark Bun et al., Differentially Private Release and Learning of Threshold 
Functions, IEEE 56TH ANN. SYMP. ON FOUNDS. COMPUTER SCI. 634, 634 (2015). 
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reasonable choice in order to ensure that the discretization error remains 
small. 
The exponential mechanism provides a good baseline for the problem 
of privately estimating the median.203 This mechanism is capable of identify-
ing an approximate median with an error of, at most,  where 
 is our privacy parameter, X is the number of elements in our discretiza-
tion, and  is the failure probability. To put things in context, assume that 
we choose the failure probability to be  = 1/1000000, and the privacy pa-
rameter to be 1 (comparable, and typically much better than current industry 
implementations of differential privacy). In addition, assume that our dis-
cretization satisfies the condition X = 1000. With these choices, the expo-
nential mechanism guarantees an error of no more than 42. Again, this 
means that, except with probability at most 1/1000000, at most 42 consum-
ers will “suffer” from an inaccurate comparison to the approximate median. 
Assuming that the city population is much bigger than 42, say  100,000, 
then this error rate seems reasonable.204
There are several advanced constructions for differentially private me-
dians that, under the above conditions, allow for privately identifying an ap-
proximate median with an error of at most  for 
some large constant C. This means that (asymptotically) the error needs to 
grow much slower with the size of the discretization X. However, in the 
currently known constructions, the constant C is relatively big, and the gains 
of having a weaker dependency of the error in X only “kicks in” when X is 
huge. For our setting, in which X  1000 suffices, these advanced construc-
tions do not achieve better guarantees than the exponential mechanism. 
The discussion thus far assumes that A-Water Corporation uses all of its 
users’ data in order to identify an estimation for the median. Moreover, it 
assumes that the computed estimation would be reported to all of the cus-
tomers in their monthly bills. However, for nudging purposes, it might be 
sufficient to release much less information which, consequently, increases 
accuracy. Specifically, in our example, the value of the (exact or approxi-
mate) median water consumption might not be important for the customer 
and thus, not a determinant factor for the effectiveness of the nudge. It is 
possible that simply indicating to Rose and David what their water con-
sumption was and whether it was below or above the median (without dis-
closing the actual median value/estimation) will suffice. In this scenario, the 
error does not need to have any dependency on X, using a framework called 
joint differential privacy. Specifically, for privacy-loss and failure parame-
ters  = 1 and  = 1/1000000, the corporation will be able to guarantee an 
 203. See Wood et al., supra note 14, at 244–46. 
 204. See generally Amos Beimel et al., Private Learning and Sanitization: Pure vs. Ap-
proximate Differential Privacy, 12 THEORY OF COMPUTING 1 (2016). 
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error of at most 14, a significant improvement over the error of the exponen-
tial mechanism. 
Table 3: Three examples for discretization: 




90 0 0  = 1
90 31 10  = 0.05
The errors depicted in Table 3 are for a single median calculation. Ide-
ally, we would want the corporation to protect customers’ privacy not only 
during each billing cycle, but for a much longer time-span (e.g., 10 years, 
during which there are 60 billing cycles). Repeated calculations could po-
tentially reveal more information about the data subjects over time and 
therefore, more noise ought to be added to each of the computations to 
maintain the same level of overall privacy.205 However, this will unavoida-
bly cause the corporation’s errors in median approximations to increase. 
Thus, depending on the specific context, policy makers might require the 
nudging entity – A-Water Corporation – to protect against several billing 
cycles (referred to as user-level differential privacy in the literature)206 or on-
ly against a single billing cycle (referred to as event-level differential priva-
cy).207
As previously stated, privacy guarantees of differential privacy are con-
trolled by the parameter . Smaller  denotes more privacy and, in turn, 
more error. Traditionally, researchers in the theoretical literature had 
thought about the privacy parameter  as a small constant, say  = 0.1. 
However, current industrial applications of differential privacy (e.g., Apple) 
are using values such as  = 1, or 2, or even 8. In addition, these industrial 
applications typically use event-level differential privacy (i.e., protect 
against a single computation, which in our case corresponds to protecting 
against a single billing cycle).208 Thus, when urging policymakers to make 
differential privacy the required standard for achieving privacy-preserving 
social norm nudges, it would be reasonable to follow the industry-level 
guarantees and deploy event-level differential privacy of  = 1, at least in 
the first step. 
 205. See Wu, supra note 20, at 1137–40. 
 206. This is also known as user-level privacy. 
 207. This method is known as event-level privacy. 
 208. E.g., Differential Privacy Team, Learning with Privacy at Scale, APPLE MACHINE 
LEARNING J. (Dec. 6, 2017), https://machinelearning.apple.com/2017/12/06/learning-with-
privacy-at-scale.html.
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As Table 4 indicates, using  = 1 would allow the corporation to use the 
social norm nudge for a longer time-span (e.g., one year). Alternatively, if 
the corporation will choose not to disclose the exact median (or even an ap-
proximation of it), but to say that “at least half of the households consume 
less than you” it would even allow our hypothetical corporation to use it for 
10 years. In the long-run, the tradeoff between privacy and social norm 
nudges is clear. 
Table 4: Number of households with  
false nudge in the long run: 
 One bill One year 10 years 
 = 1; no median published 0 0 51 
 = 1; median published with two 
points after decimal 
0 0 230 
 = 0.05; no median published 0 52 1908 
 = 0.05; median published with 
two points after decimal 
31 60 4541 
Again, the errors mentioned above are for a single median calculation. 
Adopting this approach to preserving privacy in the context of social norm 
nudges yields a number of practical benefits. First, adhering to this mathe-
matical definition of privacy assures stronger protection against a wider 
range of potential privacy threats, in comparison to existing standards, even 
in circumstances in which it is difficult for the nudging entity to anticipate 
the type of attack on privacy.209 Furthermore, using differential privacy pro-
vides guarantees even with respect to future information attacks not known 
or anticipated at the time of dissemination of the social norm nudge.210 This 
increased privacy protection enables a broader utilization of social norm 
nudges that could substantially increase the effectiveness of the nudges. 
Last, but not least, differential privacy enables the nudging entity to control 
the tradeoff between data accuracy and the level of privacy preserved and, 
therefore, maintain the flexibility to accommodate different forms of nudg-
es.
Thus far, this article highlighted the advantages of differential privacy 
framework over the widely-used de-identification techniques. However, for 
policymakers to require all nudging entities to adopt a differential privacy 
framework, one must also consider the existing legislation. As pointed out 
by Kobbi Nissim and colleagues, there seems to be a gap between the legal 
and mathematical approach to privacy.211 This is mainly because data pro-
 209. Wood et al., supra note 14, at 235. 
 210. Id.
 211. Nissim et al., supra note 20, at 691. 
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tection and privacy laws are generally context-specific, flexible, and open to 
interpretation. By contrast, differential privacy utilizes a mathematically 
rigorous definition. In this sense, it is plausible that this method of preserv-
ing privacy will pose a challenge to policymakers aiming to implement it as 
a binding standard. This challenge, or gap, between the two disciplines 
should not discourage policymakers from utilizing the advantages of differ-
ential privacy.212 In fact, in a recent article, Nissim and colleagues were able 
to demonstrate that the differential privacy framework could satisfy relevant 
legal requirements for privacy protection.213 By extracting formal mathemat-
ical requirements based on the legal standard set by the Family Educational 
Rights and Privacy Act (“FERPA”),214 they were able to prove that a differ-
ential privacy framework satisfies the mathematical solution derived by 
FERPA.215
This is just one example of how the legal and mathematical approaches 
can coincide. Of course, the variety of data protection and privacy laws, as 
well as the wide range of areas in which social norms nudges could be im-
plemented, make it difficult to produce a conclusive argument regarding the 
ability of differential privacy to satisfy the relevant legal requirements for 
privacy protection. Nevertheless, following Nissim and colleagues, we can 
assert that the differential privacy framework could protect privacy while 
satisfying the legal requirement set by legislatures in a wide range of scenar-
ios. Differential privacy can satisfy the legal requirement that disseminated 
information will not reveal any specific PII or enable a third party to infer 
any attributes that are specific to a concrete individual.216
V. Conclusion 
Social norm nudges are an important part of the regulatory toolbox. 
They are non-coercive, inexpensive, relatively easy to implement, and effec-
tive. Consequently, the advent of social nudges represents a new way for 
policymakers to promote a range of welfare-enhancing behaviors. At the 
same time, the use of social norm nudges presents a serious risk to privacy. 
 212. It is important to note that the differential privacy framework has already been im-
plemented in various real-world scenarios. See, e.g., U.S. Census Bureau, Ctr. For Econ. Stud-
ies, ONTHEMAP, https://onthemap.ces.census.gov (last visited Sept. 14, 2019); Machanava-
jjhala et al., Privacy: Theory Meets Practice on the Map, IEEE 24TH ANN. INT’L CONF. ON 
DATA ENGINEERING 277, 283–85 (2008). 
 213. Nissim et al., supra note 20, at 696. 
 214. Family Education Rights and Privacy, 73 Fed. Reg. 74,853 (Dec. 
9, 2008). 
 215. Nissim et al., supra note 20, at 734–763.
 216. See Alexandra Wood, Bridging Privacy Definitions: Differential Privacy and Con-
cepts from Privacy Law & Policy (Oct. 23, 2017), http://archive.dimacs.rutgers.edu/
Workshops/Barriers/Slides/Wood.pdf.
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Despite the importance of this threat both the literature on nudges and 
the regulatory establishment have given little attention to this problem. We 
have sought to fill this void by making two novel contributions. The first 
contribution is analytic: demonstrating that the very nature of social norm 
nudges can pose serious threats to individuals’ privacy. The second contri-
bution is policy-oriented: arguing that the strategy of differential privacy
can be used to balance between the utility of social norms nudges and the 
risk of harming individuals’ privacy. 
Although privacy and data protection laws around the world tend to fo-
cus on de-identification techniques, scholars have repeatedly shown that 
these methods are not always able to achieve the desired outcome. Thus, to 
allay the privacy concerns described throughout this article, we suggest that 
policymakers should utilize a differential privacy framework to increase the 
likelihood of privacy protection while, at the same time, taking advantage of 
the regulatory potential of social norm nudges. 
Differential privacy is a mathematical framework for guaranteeing pri-
vacy protection when analyzing data. It guarantees that a third party will not 
be able to learn any more from the information disseminated by analysis 
than he could have learned had the analysis been done without the data of 
any single individual, and considered an achievable standard “to replace or 
supplement fragile anonymization approaches.”217
Undoubtedly, differential privacy does not solve all privacy concerns 
that may arise with regard to social norm nudges, nor will it protect the in-
dividual against unauthorized collection or processing of information or 
prevent security breaches. Furthermore, using differential privacy algorithm 
involves some tradeoffs between accuracy and privacy. Specifically, more 
“noise” yields better privacy but also less accurate computation (and, hence, 
poorer social norm nudges). 
Nevertheless, throughout this article we have shown that by using an 
algorithm based on differential privacy, the nudging entity can create a vari-
ant of the social norm nudge that is both effective and provides sufficient 
protection of private data (based on the sensitivity of the data). Hence, the 
differential privacy framework provides an increased level of privacy 
preservation in comparison to leading methods of de-identification. 
Our choice of focusing on water consumption (where privacy concerns 
are relatively mild) was motivated, in part, by the lack of literature on the 
subject. It was also driven by our belief that facilitating water conservation, 
given the looming risks of climate change, is one of the greatest challenges 
of global society. Improving our capacity to use social norm nudges can 
thus have significant value. Further, we believe that our argument and poli-
 217. Chin & Klinefelter, supra note 20, at 1423. 
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cy proposals can be applied in other domains, such as health or financial da-
ta, where the privacy risks are more salient. 
By emphasizing the potential contribution of differential privacy to 
achieving a better balance between the use of data-sensitive social norm 
nudges with privacy protection we hope to persuade regulators and other 
researchers to further experiment with this idea. 

